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ABSTRACT 
Many current disputes over cultural property resulted from war 
confiscations during nineteenth-century international warfare.  
India demands the return of the Kohinoor diamond from the United 
Kingdom, while China attempts to recover copper animal heads 
seized by the British and French armies.  Do these states have legal 
rights under customary international law (CIL) to recover looted 
artifacts today when current conventions are not applied? 
Scholars often argue that such claims have no basis in CIL.  
However, this article questions their conclusions because they 
retroactively apply the current CIL-making approach to determine 
whether any CIL rules existed in the nineteenth century.  Instead, 
this article uses the intertemporal law approach to first identify the 
contemporaneous CIL-making criteria in the seventeenth through 
twentieth centuries, and then apply these tests to trace the evolution 
of the CIL rules against wartime looting of cultural property.  I argue 
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that CIL has prohibited such practices and provided restitution as 
the primary remedy in circumstances of violations since the 
nineteenth century.  This right to restitution has been established as 
a general rule that should be applied to all states rather than only 
Western “civilized nations.”  Moreover, the passage of over 150 
years since the time of removal will not inhibit claims for restitution, 
so long as the plundered artifacts still exist and are identifiable.  This 
article provides an original interpretation of CIL-making in the law 
of war with respect to cultural property and paves the legal grounds 
for claiming historically looted cultural property today. 
  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/3
2021] The Right to Restitution of Cultural Property Removed 1099 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. Introduction ..................................................................... 1101 
II. Restitution in General International Law .................... 1109 
a. The Jurisprudence of Restitution Under Current 
International Law ...................................................... 1109 
b. Tracing the Jurisprudence of Restitution in the History 
of International Law .................................................. 1111 
III. The Evolution of the CIL Rule Against Wartime Plunder 
of Cultural Property ....................................................... 1113 
a. The Formation of the CIL Rule Against Plunder in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries ..................... 1113 
i. The Approach to Identify the Formation of CIL 
Rules ............................................................... 1113 
ii. The Established CIL Rule Against Plunder ... 1116 
b. The Development of the CIL Rule Against Plunder in the 
Nineteenth Century ................................................... 1119 
i. The Approach to Identify the Validity of CIL 
Rules as Previously Established ..................... 1119 
ii. The CIL Rule Against Plunder Remained Valid
 ........................................................................ 1121 
1. Napoleon’s Looting and the Development 
of the CIL Rule Against Plunder ...... 1121 
2. Codification of the Established CIL Rule 
Against Plunder ............................... 1122 
c. The Development of the CIL Rule Against Plunder in the 
Twentieth Century .................................................... 1125 
IV. Restitution: Remedy for the Breach of the CIL Rule 
Against Plunder .............................................................. 1126 
a. Restitution After Napoleon’s Defeat ......................... 1127 
i. Dilemma on Restitution ................................. 1127 
ii. The Legal Grounds for Claiming Restitution . 1128 
iii. Reaction of the Allied Powers to Restitution .. 1129 
iv. Reaction of France to Restitution ................... 1130 
v. The CIL Right to Restitution .......................... 1132 
b. The Development of the CIL Right to Restitution During 
and After World War I .............................................. 1133 
c. The Development of the CIL Right to Restitution During 
and After World War II ............................................. 1134 
i. Broad Definition of War Plunders ................. 1134 
ii. Widespread Participation in Restitution ........ 1136 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
1100 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:4 
V. A General or European CIL Right to Restitution? ..... 1139 
a. The Evolution and Application of the Law of War .... 1140 
b. The So-Called Standard of Civilized Nations and 
Disputes over Spoils of War ...................................... 1142 
i. The Concept of Civilized Nations Under Natural 
Law ................................................................. 1143 
ii. The Changing Legal Significance of Civilized 
Nations in the Nineteenth Century ................ 1144 
VI. The Passage of Time and the CIL Right to Restitution
 ........................................................................................... 1148 
VII. Limitations to the Right to Restitution ........................ 1152 
a. The Requirement that the Objects Still Exist and Are 
Identifiable ................................................................. 1153 
b. Necessity of Restitution ............................................. 1153 
VIII. Conclusion ....................................................................... 1155 
  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/3
2021] The Right to Restitution of Cultural Property Removed 1101 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This article discusses whether claiming states have legal rights 
in international law to the restitution of cultural properties 1 
confiscated during international war in the nineteenth century.2  The 
nineteenth century witnessed an immense looting of cultural 
artifacts by Western powers from non-Western nations during their 
military confrontations. 3   There are many current disputes over 
cultural property as a result from these armed conflicts. 4   For 
 
 1 Claiming states refers to those states which claim to restitution of cultural 
properties plundered during nineteenth-century international warfare.  The term 
“cultural property” refers to objects that are important to archeology, prehistory, 
history, literature, art, or science, on either religious or secular grounds.  See 
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, T.I.A.S. No. 
83-1202, 823 U.N.T.S. 231; Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural 
Objects art. 2, June 24, 1995, 2421 U.N.T.S. 457; Council of Europe Convention on 
Offences Relating to Cultural Property art. 2(2), May 3, 2017, C.E.T.S. No. 221.  For 
multiple ways of thinking about the concept of cultural property, see Francesco 
Francioni, Public and Private in the International Protection of Global Cultural Goods, 23 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 719, 721-22 (2012). 
 2 This article adopts the term “restitution” as it discusses whether claims have 
the legal basis.  For the differences between the terms of restitution, repatriation, 
and return, see UNESCO, Note on Terminology, in WITNESSES TO HISTORY, at xxiii 
(Lyndel V. Prott ed., 2009); CRAIG FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE 
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 140-44 (2010); Wojciech Kowalski, Types of 
Claims for Recovery of Lost Cultural Property, in DISPLACED CULTURAL ASSETS: THE 
CASE OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE PROBLEMS OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN 
COUNTRIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Piotr Kosiewski & Grazyna Czubek eds., 
2004), reprinted in 57 MUSEUM INT’L, no. 4, 2005, at 85, 85-98. 
 3 For more information about how Western powers conducted vast plunder 
of cultural artifacts from other nations during this period, see generally Margaret 
M. Miles, War and Passion: Who Keeps the Art?, 49 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 5, 14–17 
(2017); MARGARET M. MILES, ART AS PLUNDER: THE ANCIENT ORIGINS OF DEBATE 
ABOUT CULTURAL PROPERTY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008); WILHELM TREUE, ART 
PLUNDER (Basil Creighton tran., 1961); WOJCIECH W. KOWALSKI, ART TREASURES AND 
WAR (Tim Schadla-Hall ed., 1998); JUDITH GRANT, A PILLAGE OF ART (Roy Publishers, 
1968); RUSSELL CHAMBERLIN, LOOT! THE HERITAGE OF PLUNDER (Facts on File 1983); 
IVAN LINDSAY, THE HISTORY OF LOOT AND STOLEN ART FROM ANTIQUITY UNTIL THE 
PRESENT DAY (Andrews UK Ltd. 2014) (2014) (ebook). 
 4 See, e.g., William R. Ognibene, Lost to the Ages: International Patrimony and the 
Problem Faced by Foreign States in Establishing Ownership of Looted Antiquities, 
84 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 605-33 (2019); Alice Lopes Fabris, South-South Cooperation on 
the Return of Cultural Property: The Case of South America, 49 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 
173, 173-96 (2017); Yoshiaki Sato, “Settled Completely and Finally”: A Japanese 
Perspective on the Repatriationism of Cultural Property, 10 J.E. ASIA & INT’L L. 197, 197-
219 (2017); Barbara Plankensteiner, The Benin Treasures: Difficult Legacy and Contested 
Heritage, in CULTURAL PROPERTY AND CONTESTED OWNERSHIP 133-55 (Brigitta 
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example, British armies seized the Kohinoor diamond as a war 
trophy from India and presented it to the Queen of England in 1849.5  
India has demanded the return of this diamond since its 
independence in 1947. 6   This request was firmly refused by 
successive British prime ministers.7  As then Prime Minister David 
Cameron asserted, “If you say yes to one, you suddenly find the 
British Museum would be empty.”8  In another instance, British and 
French armies looted countless works of art from China’s Old 
Summer Palace during the second Opium War in 1860. 9   These 
artifacts were so unique that even French General Baron Montoubon 
who participated in this looting amazed, “[N]othing in our Europe 
can give an idea of equal luxury.” 10   It is unclear where these 
plundered artifacts are currently located. 11   Recently, art dealers 
have begun to frequently auction artifacts apparently belonging to 
China’s Old Summer Palace. 12   These auctions infuriated many 
 
Hauser-Schäublin & Lyndel V. Prott eds., 2017); Melissa (YoungJae) Koo, Note, 
Repatriation of Korean Cultural Property Looted by Japan—Can a Sincere Apology Resolve 
the Centuries-Old Korea/Japan Disputes?, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 625, 625–50 
(2015). 
 5 See Satish Jacob, Indian MPs demand Kohinoor’s return, BBC NEWS (Apr. 26, 
2000, 17:11 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/727231.stm 
[https://perma.cc/4RRM-5JUB]; Koh-i-Noor: India says it should not claim priceless 
diamond from UK, BBC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-
asia-india-36079644 [https://perma.cc/TGT2-4XFU]; Ghoshray, infra note 292, at 
749-50. 
 6 Ghoshray, infra note 292, at 752. 
 7 Koh-i-Noor, supra note 5. 
 8 Id. 
 9 YOUNG-TSU WONG, A PARADISE LOST: THE IMPERIAL GARDEN YUANMING YUAN 
139-143 (Univ. Hawai’i Press 2001); Bowlby, infra note 13. 
 10 WONG, supra note 9, at 139. 
 11 See Dong Lei (董磊), Ying Paimaihang Qiangxing Paimai Cong Yuanmingyuan 
Jielue Wenwu Zhongguo Guojia Wenwuju Qianze (英拍卖行强行拍卖从圆明园劫掠文
物中国国家文物局谴责) [China’s State Bureau of Cultural Property Condemned the 
British Auction House to Sell the China’s Old Summer Palace Plunders], CANKAO XIAOXI 
( 参 考 军 事 ) [MILITARY REFERENCE] (Apr. 11, 2018), 
http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/mil/20180411/2261289_2.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/C3XH-A6PS] (noting that around 1.5 million items were 
originally plundered). 
 12 E.g., Bo Leung, Stolen relics spur strong feelings, CHINA DAILY (June 19, 2018, 
15:19), https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/47/170/199/1529392506935.html 
[https://perma.cc/MC3H-F9TD]; ‘Looted’ Chinese treasures auctioned, BBC NEWS 
(May 2, 2000, 14:29 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/733543.stm 
[https://perma.cc/3P5J-AXBB]. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/3
2021] The Right to Restitution of Cultural Property Removed 1103 
Chinese, which has spurred an ongoing state plan that the Chinese 
government attempts to recover these artifacts.13 
These disputes are considered some of the most controversial 
issues today, which draw extensive discussions.  Many authors 
argue for restitution under human rights law, emphasizing the 
importance of returning significant cultural artifacts to preserve the 
identity of peoples and communities.14  Other scholars in favor of 
restitution base their arguments on ethical or political grounds, such 
as redressing historical wrongs,15 consolidating national identities,16 
 
 13 Chris Bowlby, The palace of shame that makes China angry, BBC NEWS (Feb. 2, 
2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30810596 
[https://perma.cc/GAY7-F8FK] (quoting Niu Xianfeng, General Director of the 
National Treasures Fund, which is affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Culture, 
“We’re making a plan to start a series of actions to recover these antiques and get 
them back to China.”); see also Leung, supra note 12. 
 14 See, e.g., Evelien Campfens, The Bangwa Queen: Artifact or Heritage?, 26 INT’L 
J. CULTURAL PROP. 75-110 (2019) (“A human rights law approach to restitution 
claims can be understood as the acknowledgement of a right to possess, access, or 
control certain involuntary lost cultural objects on the grounds of their intangible 
heritage interests for specific people . . . .”); Francesco Francioni & Lucas Lixinski, 
Opening the Toolbox of International Human Rights Law in the Safeguarding of Cultural 
Heritage, in HERITAGE, CULTURE AND RIGHTS 11, 18 (Andrea Durbach & Lucas 
Lixinski eds., 2017) (arguing for a recognition of cultural heritage as a “full 
member” of the legal framework of human rights); Sarah Fründt, Return Logistics-
Repatriation Business: Managing the Return of Ancestral Remains to New Zealand, in 
CULTURAL PROPERTY AND CONTESTED OWNERSHIP 178-97 (Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin 
& Lyndel V. Prott eds., 2017) (describing New Zealand’s repatriation program, its 
implementation and potential improvements).  See generally CULTURAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS (Francesco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds., Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 2008) 
(analyzing the concept of culture and human rights and to assess the impact that 
they are having on international law and the development of a coherent category 
of cultural human rights). 
 15  See, e.g., Elazar Barkan, Amending Historical Injustices: The Restitution 
of Cultural Property--An Overview, in CLAIMING THE STONES, NAMING THE BONES: 
CULTURAL PROPERTY AND THE NEGOTIATION OF NATIONAL AND ETHNIC IDENTITY 16-46 
(Elazar Barkan & Ronald Bush eds., 2002); ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS 
308-51 (2000); PATRICK J. O’KEEFE & LYNDEL V. PROTT, 3 LAW AND THE CULTURAL 
HERITAGE 839-43 (1984). 
 16  See O’KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 15; Valdimar Tr. Hafstein & Martin 
Skrydstrup, Heritage vs. Property, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO CULTURAL 
PROPERTY 38, 39 (2017) (regarding “[c]ultural property as a technology of 
sovereignty”); Charlotte Edwardes & Catherine Milner, Egypt demands return of the 
Rosetta Stone, TELEGRAPH (Jul. 20, 2003), 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/1
436606/Egypt-demands-return-of-the-Rosetta-Stone.html 
[https://perma.cc/V95J-HLFN] (“[T]hey should volunteer to return the Rosetta 
Stone because it is the icon of our Egyptian identity.”). 
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or carrying out the necessary steps of decolonization. 17   Some 
scholars, however, reject these claims as having weak connections to 
the culture of modern states or having merely political or moral 
sentiment without a legal basis.18  Many scholars also analyze this 
issue in the context of debates about cultural property 
internationalism and cultural property nationalism, which address 
whether cultural property should be considered a common heritage 
belonging to all peoples or a national heritage only belonging to 
certain countries.19 
This article focuses on the essential legal issue, which has been 
rarely discussed, as to whether claiming states have legal rights in 
the law of war to recover cultural property confiscated during 
nineteenth-century warfare. 20   Although current conventions 
dealing with cultural property in the event of armed conflicts cannot 
be retroactively applied,21 this limitation does not necessarily impact 
 
 17  See A.F. Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural 
Objects, in WITNESSES TO HISTORY, supra note 2, at 195; O’KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 
15. 
 18 See, e.g., O’KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 15, at 839-41; John Henry Merryman, 
Thinking about the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1881, 1915-16 (1985); JAMES 
CUNO, WHO OWNS ANTIQUITY? THE BATTLE OVER OUR ANCIENT HERITAGE 21-66 
(Princeton Univ. Press 2008). 
 19 John H. Merryman initiated this debate.  See Merryman, supra note 18, at 
1901; John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 831, 831–53 (1986); John Henry Merryman, Cultural Property 
Internationalism, 12 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP., 11, 11–39 (2005); John Henry Merryman, 
The Nation and the Object, in WHOSE CULTURE? 183-203 (James Cuno ed., 2009).  For 
recent discussions, see Sabrina Y. Hsieh, The Charitable Deduction and Looting of 
Antiquities: A Comparative Approach, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 471, 474-75 (2018); Grant 
Strother, Resolving Cultural Property Disputes in the Shadow of the Law, 19 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 335, 357-58 (2014); Raechel Anglin, The World Heritage List: Bridging 
the Cultural Property Nationalism-Internationalism Divide, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 241, 
241-75 (2008). 
 20 Different from this article, many scholars discuss the legal issue of cultural 
property in the context of the Nazis looting during the Holocaust era and World 
War II.  See, e.g., Victoria Bonadies, Taking Greater Responsibility: Austria’s Art 
Restitution Act and the Need for Further Reform, 34 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 671, 671-99 
(2019); Jennifer A. Kreder, Analysis of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of 
2016, 20 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 1–25 (2017); KEVIN P. RAY, TRANSACTIONS IN ART & 
CULTURAL PROPERTY 133-54 (2016). 
 21  See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of 
Armed Conflict art. 4, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter the 1954 Hague 
Convention]; The 1954 Hague Convention, supra, Protocol, art. 3, at 358; Protocol 
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 53, June 8, 
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the 
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 6, Mar. 26, 1999, 
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whether there is any equivalent rule of customary international law 
(CIL) as discussed by this article.  There have been increasing state 
practices across the world to return cultural artifacts plundered 
during warfare of previous centuries to their countries of origin.22  
For example, the United States returned three church bells, which 
were seized by American soldiers as war trophies from the 
Philippines in 1901, to Philippine authorities in December 2018.23  
These practices raise an important question as to whether they 
reflect a basis in CIL for restitution.  
It is a well-established CIL rule that “[a] state responsible for an 
internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make 
restitution.”24  In this regard, to establish restitution under the law 
of war, it is necessary to first inquire whether a CIL rule that 
prohibited wartime looting of cultural artifacts (the CIL rule against 
plunder) existed in the nineteenth century.  Many scholars argue 
that the CIL rule against plunder has been established since the end 
of the nineteenth century, which was demonstrated by the adoption 
of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.25  These conventions 
remarkably showed a general consensus on the law of war, as states 
from different continents and political backgrounds sat together to 
discuss this matter for the first time ever.26  Alternatively, many 
other scholars claim that this rule was created due to increasing state 
 
2253 U.N.T.S. 172; Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on 
Land art. 56, Jul. 29, 1899, T.S. No. 403 [hereinafter the 1899 Hague Conventions]; 
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 56, Oct. 18, 1907, 
T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter the 1907 Hague Conventions]. 
 22 See infra text accompanying notes 265-281. 
 23 Julie McCarthy, U.S. Returns Balangiga Church Bells To The Philippines After 
More Than A Century, NPR NEWS (Dec. 11, 2018, 5:05 AM ET), 
http://www.npr.org/2018/12/11/675505073/after-117-years-balangiga-bells-
will-be-returned-to-the-philippines [https://perma.cc/98VM-ZJ7D]. 
 24 Infra note 42, at art. 35.  
 25 Charles de Visscher argued that the doctrine of international law against 
plundering cultural property was accepted by all nations during the two Hague 
Conventions in 1899 and 1907.  Charles de Visscher, International Protection of Works 
of Art and Historic Monuments, DOCUMENTS & STATE PAPERS OF JULY 1949, reprinted in 
8 INT’L INFO. & CULTURAL SERIES 821, 827–28 (1949).  Merryman argued that 
international law prohibited plundering since the late nineteenth century.  See JOHN 
HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 14 (2d ed. 
1987).  Wayne Sandholtz argues that this legal norm was transmitted into general 
international law at the end of the nineteenth century due to the adoption of the 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.  See WAYNE SANDHOLTZ, PROHIBITING 
PLUNDER, HOW NORMS CHANGE 39-45, 67-70 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).   
 26 Andrew Webster, Hague Conventions (1899, 1907), in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
WAR (Gordon Martel ed., 2012). 
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practices to protect cultural artifacts in the context of the two World 
Wars.27  Moreover, widespread participation of states in returning 
looted cultural artifacts to their countries of origin occurred after the 
end of World War II.28  In light of this history, these scholars thus 
agree that the law of war in the nineteenth century did not forbid 
the looting of cultural artifacts.29 
These scholars clearly make their arguments by applying the 
two-element approach to identify CIL, which requires general state 
practice and the opinio juris (or acceptance as law).30  General state 
practice must be “sufficiently widespread and representative, as 
well as consistent.”31  Opinio juris refers to a feeling or belief that 
states have legal rights or obligations to perform certain practices.32  
 
 27  Patrick J. O’Keefe, who has studied the return of dispossessed cultural 
property for more than forty years, observes that the principle against wartime 
looting was established in the early twentieth century.  See PATRICK J. O’KEEFE, 
PROTECTING CULTURAL OBJECTS: BEFORE AND AFTER 1970 3-4 (Inst. Art & L. 2017) 
(outlining different treaties on wartime looting in the early twentieth century).  
Wojciech Kowalski, who has given contributions to addressing the international 
right to restitution as well as its principles, argues that this right was fully 
established after World War I.  KOWALSKI, supra note 3, at 81.  For more scholars 
who follow their ideas, see Duncan Chappell & Saskia Hufnagel, The Gurlitt Case: 
German and International Responses to Ownership Rights in Looting Cases, in CULTURAL 
PROPERTY CRIME 221-22 (Joris D. Kila & Marc Balcells eds., 2014); Karen Goepfert, 
The Decapitation of Rameses II, 13 B.U. Int’l L.J. 503, 520-25 (1995). 
 28 See infra text accompanying notes 192-220.   
 29 See supra notes 25, 27 and accompanying text; MILES, ART AS PLUNDER, supra 
note 3, at 349-53. 
 30 For the two-element approach, see Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter the ICJ Statute]; Int’l 
Law Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law 
with Commentaries, Conclusion 2, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 124 (2018) [hereinafter 
the ILC].   
 31 ILC, supra note 30, at 135; cf. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. v. 
Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶73 (Feb. 20):  
 With respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary before 
a conventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of 
international law, . . . a very widespread and representative 
participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it 
included that of States whose interests were specially affected.  
See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. 
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶186 (June 27) (“The Court does not consider that, 
for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in 
absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule.”). 
 32 See, e.g., SS. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 28 
(Sept. 7); North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 31, at ¶77; Jurisdictional 
Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99, 
122, ¶55 (Feb. 3); Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Judgment, 
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However, this two-element test only represents our current 
understanding of how CIL is formulated and ascertained. 33  
Applying the current approach to examine the formation of CIL 
rules in earlier centuries is itself against the principle of non-
retroactivity.  Non-retroactivity is well recognized as the basic 
principle of law requiring the rules of law “not having effect from a 
date before it was made.”34  This principle requires an intertemporal 
law approach to examine the legality of CIL rules “by the legal 
standards valid at the time of its enactment.” 35   In this respect, 
whether or not a nineteenth-century CIL rule existed should be 
determined by the contemporaneous nineteenth-century approach.  
However, it is unclear what the legal tests were to establish and 
develop CIL rules at that time.36  This ambiguity makes the views of 
those scholars who claim that the law of war in the nineteenth 
century did not prohibit the looting of cultural artifacts 
questionable.37 
This article uses the intertemporal law approach to first explore 
the CIL-making criteria of the seventeenth through twentieth 
centuries and then apply these tests to trace the evolution of the CIL 
rule against plunder and the CIL right to restitution as the legal 
 
1960 I.C.J. 6, 9 (Apr. 12) (dissenting opinion by Chagla, J.); ILC, supra note 30, 
Conclusion 9 and Commentary (2), at 138. 
 33 This current approach can only be traced to Article 38 of the Statute of 
Permanent Court of International Justice of 1920.  Statute of the Permanent Court 
of International Justice art. 38, Dec. 16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 389.  
 34  Non-retroactivity, TRANSLEGAL, https://www.translegal.com/legal-english-
dictionary/non-retroactivity [https://perma.cc/UHD2-NMDS]. 
 35  Markus Kotzur, Intertemporal Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW para. 5 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed, 2008), MPEPIL 1322, 
https://opil.ouplaw.com [https://perma.cc/Z6E8-29JY] (last visited Mar. 10, 
2020). 
 36 The contemporary literature contains almost no analysis about legal tests 
prior to the current approach.  However, there are other understandings of the 
formation of CIL rules in history than the intertemporal law approach.  See, e.g., B. 
S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 
1, 1-46 (2018); J. Patrick Kelly, Customary International Law in Historical Context, in 
REEXAMINING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 47, 47-85 (Brian D. Lepard ed., 2017). 
 37 Contrary to these scholars, Stanislaw E. Nahlik, a prominent contemporary 
international law jurist, stated that the plunder of cultural property was prohibited 
by the law of war in the nineteenth century, but he did not provide analysis to his 
argument.  See Stanislaw E. Nahlik, International Law and the Protection of Cultural 
Property in Armed Conflicts, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1071-72 (1976). 
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remedy.38  These analyses reveal that “the rule against such plunder 
was indeed founded in the laws and customs of war in the 
eighteenth century, became well established in the nineteenth 
century, and further developed in the twentieth century.”39  On this 
basis, this article finds that the CIL right to restitution has been 
established as the primary remedy over compensation for violations 
of the CIL rule against plunder since the nineteenth century.  It 
further argues that the right to restitution has been established as a 
general CIL rule that should be applied to all nations.  Moreover, the 
passage of over one and a half centuries does not bar this right, so 
long as plundered artifacts still exist and are identifiable.  States that 
were plundered in the nineteenth-century war therefore have strong 
legal grounds for claiming restitution. 
This article is divided into eight parts beginning with the 
introduction.  Part II analyzes the jurisprudence of restitution as a 
legal remedy in international law.  Part III explores the legal tests for 
identifying CIL rules during the seventeenth through twentieth 
centuries and then applies these tests to examine the evolution of the 
CIL rule against plunder.  Part IV investigates how restitution has 
 
 38  Although many scholars study the evolution of the rule that protects 
cultural property during armed conflicts, the question remains as to when and how 
this rule has been established in CIL.  For examples of scholarship as such, see 
Rüdiger Wolfrum, Cultural Property, Protection in Armed Conflict, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2010), MPEPIL 278, 
https://opil.ouplaw.com [https://perma.cc/Z6E8-29JY] (last visited Mar. 10, 
2020); Patty Gerstenblith, Protecting Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict: Looking Back, 
Looking Forward, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 677, 677-708 (2009); 
SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25; Sandholtz, infra notes 157 and 193; Patrick J. Boylan, The 
Concept of Cultural Protection in Times of Armed Conflict: From the Crusades to the New 
Millennium, in ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES: THE THEFT OF CULTURE AND THE EXTINCTION OF 
ARCHAEOLOGY 43-108 (Neil Brodie & Kathryn Walker Tubb eds., 2003); ROGER 
O’KEEFE, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED CONFLICT 5-91 (2006); 
FORREST, supra note 2, at 63-73; JIRI TOMAN, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT 4-5 (Dartmouth Publ’g Co. 1996); Stanislaw-
Edward Nahlik, Protection of Cultural Property, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF 
HUMANITARIAN LAW 203-15 (UNESCO 1986); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on 
Criminal Jurisdiction in International Protection of Cultural Property, 10 SYRACUSE J. 
INT’L L. & COM. 281, 287-97 (1983); O’KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 15; de Visscher, supra 
note 25; Alan Marchisotto, The Protection of Art in Transnational Law, 7 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 689-724 (1973); Lakshmikanth Penna, Protection of Cultural 
Property During Armed Conflict, in SHELTER FROM THE STORM: DEVELOPMENTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Maley William ed. 1997); Andrea Cunning, 
The Safeguarding of Cultural Property in Times of War & Peace, 11 TULSA J. COMP. & 
INT’L L. 211, 211-23 (2003); Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Legal Regime for Protecting 
Cultural Property During Armed Conflict, 42 A.F.L. REV. 277, 280-89 (1997). 
 39 Yue Zhang, Customary International Law and the Rule Against Taking Cultural 
Property as Spoils of War, 17 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 943, 943 (2018). 
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been established as the primary remedy for the breach of the CIL 
rule against plunder.  Part V discusses whether the CIL right to 
restitution has been a general CIL rule that should be applied to all 
nations since the nineteenth century.  Part VI focuses on whether the 
passage of time inhibits the claims of restitution.  Part VII inquires 
as to the limitations to enforcing restitution, which requires that the 
objects for restitution still exist and are identifiable, with a practical 
consideration of necessity that should be determined by claiming 
states.  This article concludes by bringing together the results of my 
analysis in Part VIII. This article provides an original interpretation 
of CIL-making in history and the law of war in the protection of 
cultural property.  Applying these conclusions to current disputes 
would thus ultimately transform the current debates about 
restitution and retention of displaced cultural property. 
II. RESTITUTION IN GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 
This Part analyzes the jurisprudence of restitution as a state 
responsibility in current international law.  It then traces the 
historical development of restitution to examine whether restitution 
was also established as the primary remedy for states’ international 
wrongful acts starting in the seventeenth century, a period deemed 
to be the beginning of the modern international law era. 
a. The Jurisprudence of Restitution Under Current International Law 
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, one of primary meanings 
of restitution refers to “return or restoration of some specific thing 
to its rightful owner or status.” 40   Under international law, 
restitution defines a state’s responsibility of reparation that arises 
from wrongful acts that states have committed.41  The International 
Law Commission (ILC)’s Articles on State Responsibility represent 
a great achievement by the Commission that codifies the law of state 
 
 40 Restitution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), Westlaw.   
 41  JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON 
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 213 (2002); see ILC U.N. Doc. A/56/10, infra note 42. 
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responsibility.42  According to Article 35, restitution means “to re-
establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was 
committed.”43  Article 36(1) confirms that restitution serves as the 
primary remedy of reparation while state responsibility for 
compensation would be made only if “such damage is not made 
good by restitution.”44  The obligation to perform restitution could 
be precluded if the objects that would be subject to restitution are 
materially impossible to return. 45   As the ILC’s commentary to 
Article 35 explains, restitution serves as the first form of reparation 
because “restitution most closely conforms to the general principle 
that the responsible State is bound to wipe out the legal and material 
consequences of its wrongful act by re-establishing the situation that 
would exist if that act had not been committed.”46 
The reasoning behind requiring restitution over compensation 
as the primary remedy of reparation is based on the Factory at 
Chorzów case of 1928. 47   In this case, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice first provided a general definition of 
reparation:  
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an 
illegal act . . . is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe 
out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the 
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that 
act had not been committed.48   
The court then concluded that it was a basic rule of international law 
that states were liable for restitution due to violations of 
international law, and compensation should be made only if 
restitution was not possible.49 
 
 42 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 96-97, U.N. DOC 
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1. 
 43 Id. at art. 35. 
 44 See id. at art. 36(1) (establishing that the State should resort to restitution 
before compensating for the damage).  
 45 Id. at art. 35(1). 
 46 Id. at art. 35; CRAWFORD, supra note 41. 
 47 Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, supra note 42, at 91. 
 48 Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 
47 (Sept. 13). 
 49 Id. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/3
2021] The Right to Restitution of Cultural Property Removed 1111 
b. Tracing the Jurisprudence of Restitution in the History of 
International Law 
Many authorities refer to the Factory at Chorzów case when 
discussing the legitimacy of restitution in international law,50 as if 
the legal rules for restitution were founded in general international 
law starting in this case.  However, restitution was established as a 
legal remedy not only in Roman law,51 but also in the practices of 
warfare in ancient Roman era.  As Pierino Belli, a classical 
international law writer observed, restitution had been one of main 
themes surrounding war and peace since the Ancient Greek and 
Roman eras. 52   Hugo Grotius, who is often referred to as the 
founding father of international law beginning in the seventeenth 
century, listed many instances illustrating that Roman conquerors 
restored spoils of war to conquered parties when such looting 
violated the justice of war.53 
Restitution was well established in the law of war during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  As Belli stated, “[P]eace 
restores everything to its original condition (so that what war has 
taken away is restored forthwith by peace).” 54   Restitution was 
prevalent especially when the capture of property was made 
contrary to just war or just cause.55  As Grotius wrote, “What [wa]s 
done in an unjust war [wa]s unjust in itself,” and thus “what [wa]s 
 
         50 See CRAWFORD, supra note 41, at 213; Attila Tanzi, Restitution, in MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW para. 1 (Rüdiger Wolfrum 
ed., 2013), MPEPIL 1094, http://opil.ouplaw.com [https://perma.cc/Z6E8-29JY] 
(last visited Mar. 10, 2020).  See generally Christine Gray, The Choice Between 
Restitution and Compensation, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 413 (1999) (discussing reference to 
the Factory at Chorzow case by the International Court of Justice in various cases 
involving restitution). 
 51 Restitution, supra note 40. 
 52 See 2 PIERINO BELLI, A TREATISE ON MILITARY MATTERS 8 (James Brown Scott 
ed., Herbert C. Nutting trans., 1936) (noting that restitution was a frequent cause of 
wars). 
 53 3 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 1419 n.2, 1513-15 (Richard 
Tuck & Knud Haakonssen eds., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2005) (recalling “Macrinus 
restored the Prisoners and Booty to the Parthians, because the Romans had broken 
the Treaty without Cause.”). 
 54 2 BELLI, supra note 52, at 284. 
 55 1 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 396, n.15 (Richard Tuck & 
Knud Haakonssen eds., Liberty Fund 2005) (according to Saint Austin, “the 
Restitution of what was taken away unjustly” was deemed a well-accepted cause 
to start a just war, which was also written in the Canon law.). 
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taken away by an Enemy in an unjust War, [should] be restored.”56  
As Samuel Pufendorf, another classical international law writer in 
the seventeenth century, argued, “Whoever himself takes by unjust 
violence and keeps another’s property is bound to restore it.” 57  
Christian Wolff, who was another classical international law writer 
in the eighteenth century, likewise held, “[W]ho wages an unjust 
war is bound to restore property taken by force from another whose 
war is just.”58 
Restitution was also prevalent in early common law precedents, 
especially when the object was irreplaceable due to its historical and 
cultural significance.  In the Pusey v. Pusey case of 1684, England’s 
High Court of Chancery issued the order to restore an ancient horn 
to the plaintiff who inherited the horn from his ancestors.59  This case 
suggests that monetary compensation could not replace restitution 
when the objects in dispute had unique historical and cultural 
significance.  Likewise in the Falcke v. Gray case of 1859, in which the 
High Court of Chancery was requested to order the specific 
performance of a contract to purchase two china jars,60  the court 
noted, compensation would not be a satisfactory remedy for non-
performance, because the articles for purchase were of “unusual 
beauty, rarity and distinction.”61   Although these cases were not 
related to states’ claims, these decisions reflected the jurisprudence 
of restitution as the primary remedy over compensation, especially 
when cultural artifacts were the objects that were subject to 
restitution.  This jurisprudence also explains why CIL has adopted 
restitution as the primary remedy for the violations of the rule of the 
law of war that prohibits the looting of cultural property, as 
discussed by the following sections.   
 
 56 3 GROTIUS, supra note 53, at 1416, 1512. 
 57  2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS LIBRI 
DUO [TWO BOOKS ON THE ELEMENTS OF THE UNIVERSAL LAW] 266, at para. 314 (27) 
(James Brown Scott ed., William Abbott Oldfather trans., 1931). 
 58 2 CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM [THE 
LAW OF NATIONS ACCORDING TO THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD] 407 (James Brown Scott ed., 
Joseph H. Drake trans., 1934). 
 59 Pusey v. Pusey (1684) 23 Eng. Rep. 465, 465; 1 Vern. 272, 273.  
 60 See Falcke v. Gray (1859) 62 Eng. Rep. 250, 252-55; 4 Drewry. 651, 656-65 
(noting that usually the court would issue specific performance because the object 
at issue was so rare).  The court ultimately decided to not award specific 
performance for contractual reasons.  Id. at 255; 4 Drewry. at 665.   
 61 Id. at 252; 4 Drewry. at 658.  
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III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIL RULE AGAINST WARTIME 
PLUNDER OF CULTURAL PROPERTY 
This part first explores the different legal tests for identifying 
CIL rules during the seventeenth through twentieth centuries and 
then applies these tests to illustrate how the CIL rule against such 
plunder was indeed founded in the laws and customs of war in the 
eighteenth century, became well established in the nineteenth 
century, and was further developed in the twentieth century.   
a. The Formation of the CIL Rule Against Plunder in the Seventeenth 
and Eighteenth Centuries 
Plundering an enemy’s property had long been justified by the 
motto “to the victor belong the spoils” in early history.62  However, 
no one can deny that such practices are absolutely prohibited by 
international law today.63  Thus, it is clear that there has been a 
substantial change in the legal treatment of cultural artifacts during 
warfare over time.  As this section shows, this shift indeed occurred 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries under natural law 
jurisprudence.   
i. The Approach to Identify the Formation of CIL Rules 
The customary law of nations during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries was not exactly identical to what we currently 
understand of CIL. 64   The law of nations, a common term for 
 
 62 LEONARD D. DUBOFF & SALLY H. CAPLAN, THE DESKBOOK OF ART LAW 129 
(1977). 
 63 See generally supra notes 21 (describing current conventions dealing with 
cultural property in the event of armed conflicts), 38 (describing the scholarship on 
the evolution of the rule that protects cultural property during armed conflicts); cf. 
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of 
Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex, Statute of the 
International Tribunal art. 3(d) (May 3, 1992) (subjecting prohibited seizures to 
prosecution). 
 64 The customary law of nations as a main source of international law was not 
as uniformly categorized as the CIL is today.  Instead, different writers framed the 
customary law of nations in different categories.  For instance, Grotius divided the 
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international law at that time, was framed according to natural law 
philosophy, which deduced legal rules from the presumed supreme 
legal authority on the basis of law and morality.65  Under natural 
law, the law of nations adopted different sources of law than what 
we have today.66  First, the highest source of the law of nations was 
the writings of classical international law writers in their respective 
times. 67   The significance for individual writers in identifying 
general international law is enormously different from today, as 
writings of international law publicists are now only considered as 
a “subsidiary means” to this end.68  Second, usage was considered 
the main body of the law of nations during this period.  As the 
celebrated British Judge Lord Stowell observed in the Flad Oyen case 
of 1799, “A great part of the law of nations stands on [the usage and 
practice of nations].”69  This proof value was influenced mostly by 
the British legal system, in which usages alone were able to create 
 
law of nations into natural law and voluntary law, the latter category including the 
customary law of nations.  1 GROTIUS, supra note 55, at 147-60.  de Vattel, on the 
other hand, classified the law into four categories—the necessary, the voluntary, 
the conventional, and the customary law of nations.  EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF 
NATIONS lviii §7, lxv-lxvi §27, (Joseph Chitty ed., Liberty 1844). 
 65 See T.J. LAWRENCE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 442-43 (Hans Kelson 
& Robert Tucker eds., 2d ed. 1966); BIRGIT SCHLUTTER, DEVELOPMENTS IN CUSTOMARY 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 2010). 
 66 The international community has established a doctrinal system to ascertain 
the sources of international law since the beginning of the twentieth century, which 
categorizes the law as international conventional law, CIL, and general principles 
of law.  See, e.g., Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, supra note 
33, art. 38 (1).  The statute of ICJ accepted this doctrinal system of the sources with 
slight variations in expression.  See, e.g., The ICJ Statute, supra note 30, art. 38 (1). 
 67 See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (London, John Murray, 
1888); GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON & GEORGE FOX TUCKER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-41 
(5th ed. 1910) (“the writings of the great publicists . . . as the highest source of 
authority . . . in the domain of international law”); ARCHER POLSON, PRINCIPLES OF 
THE LAW OF NATIONS 20-21 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson, 1853) (detailing the 
authority of text writers “whenever they record the usages and practice of 
nations”). 
 68 The ICJ Statute, supra note 30, art. 38(1)(d). 
 69 The “Flad Oyen” (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 124, 126; 1 C. Rob. 134, 139; see also 
HENRY WHEATON & COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, WHEATON’S ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 5-6 (5th ed. 1916).  Twiss also quoted this statement in his treatise of the law of 
nations in the nineteenth century.  TRAVERS TWISS, TWO INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON 
THE SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (London, Longman, Brown, Green, and 
Longmans, 1856). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/3
2021] The Right to Restitution of Cultural Property Removed 1115 
legal rules.70  The establishment of usages required uniform acts by 
nations with a long period of observation.71   
Instead of a universal application, usages were usually valid 
only among nations that actually engaged in certain practices on a 
reciprocal basis.72  This feature explains why some customary rules 
were even optional and allowed states to unilaterally withdraw.73  
However, mandatory customary rules did exist during the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and they had a universal 
application under natural law theory.  Such mandatory customary 
rules required not only usages but also a subjective element, i.e., the 
law of nature, which was based on justice and reasonableness and 
could be proved by the use of reason.74  The law of nature indeed 
constituted the fundamental basis of natural law jurisprudence and 
made all rules of the law of nations legally binding.75  The validity 
of mandatory CIL rules thus had to be tested by the law of nature.76   
Accordingly, the law of nations during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries required two elements to identify mandatory 
CIL rules under natural law jurisprudence: usages on the basis of 
long-established and uniform practices, and the law of nature to 
validate those usages.  This observation was well recognized in the 
Silesian Loan case of 1753, as the British government defined the idea 
of “[t]he Law of Nations, founded upon Justice, Equity, 
Convenience and the Reason of the Thing, and confirmed by long 
 
 70  See ROBERT MORDEN, GEOGRAPHY RECTIFIED: OR, A DESCRIPTION OF THE 
WORLD 22 (1688) (“The Common Law of England is a Collection of the General 
Common Custom, and Usages of the Kingdom.”); see also Custom, OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015).  Such importance is quite different from our 
understanding today that regards usage as merely the material element of CIL and 
requires state consent or opinio juris to be legally binding.  See the ICJ Statute, supra 
note 30, art. 38 (1)(b). 
 71 As Suarez observed, usages among nations were binding in the intercourse 
among them, and such usages needed to be long observed and uniformly acted 
upon.  TWISS, supra note 69, at 11. 
 72 DE VATTEL, supra note 64, at lxv §25. 
 73 Cf. William S. Dodge, Withdrawing from Customary International Law: Some 
Lessons from History, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 169, 171-75 (2010), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/withdrawing-from-customary-international-
law-some-lessons-from-history [https://perma.cc/LU5N-7NLD]. 
 74 See id.; 1 GROTIUS, supra note 55, at 147-60 (describing how different legal 
disciplines are tested by the law of nature).  
 75  SCHLÜTTER, supra note 65; PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 65. 
 76 See WM. OKE MANNING, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 80 (London, 
S. Sweet 1839). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
1116 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:4 
Usage.”77   This statement was well recognized among European 
nations “as one of the ablest expositions of international law” at that 
time.78   
ii. The Established CIL Rule Against Plunder 
Looting an enemy’s cultural artifacts had been a common 
practice since at least the Roman era, long justified by the traditional 
right of conquest.79  However, sovereigns in Europe began to stop 
plundering each other’s cultural artifacts starting with the Peace of 
Westphalia of 1648.80  Moreover, the looting of cultural artifacts was 
abandoned almost entirely during the eighteenth century.81  These 
uniform practices among European sovereigns, which continued for 
nearly one and a half centuries, strongly suggested that a new usage 
had been established to oblige parties engaging in warfare not to 
plunder cultural artifacts.82  It is interesting to question why this 
shift in practices of warfare occurred during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.  It is not likely that the abstention from looting 
resulted from the lack of interest in looting or lack of capacity to 
 
 77  Arnold D. McNair et al., The Debt of International Law in Britain to the Civil 
Law and the Civilians, 39 PROBS. PUB. & PRIV. INT’L L. 183, 192 (1953).  This opinion 
was especially significant for demonstrating the relationship between usage and 
the law of nature.  Id. at 194-95.  The British Crown acquired this opinion from its 
officers including Lord Mansfield, who was deemed one of the most celebrated 
judges on the English bench.  Id.; BRIERLY, infra note 99.  Opinions as such were 
usually provided as confidential advice to the Crown.  McNair et al., supra, at 194-
95.  However, this opinion was written in reply to the Prussian statement of this 
case, and this made it publishable among other nations in Europe.  Id.   
 78 1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 55, para. 
XX (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson 1854). 
 79 See de Visscher, supra note 25, at 823; MILES, ART AS PLUNDER, supra note 3, 
at 13, 52; MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 13; Stephan Wilske, International Law and the 
Spoils of War: To the Victor the Right of Spoils?, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFFS. 223, 
242-43 (1998) (describing the Roman Empire’s legal system regarding “spoils of 
artworks.”); SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25, at 32-34. 
 80 See Penna, supra note 38, at 258; TREUE, supra note 3, at 162 (noting lack of 
large-scale art plundering in Germany and Austria since 1648); Merryman, infra 
note 173, at 325; de Visscher, supra note 25, at 824; Nahlik, supra note 38, at 203. 
 81 See de Visscher, supra note 25, at 824; PERCY BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WAR 
BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS 62 (1908) (describing the “respect shown for private 
property” by the British conduct during the War of 1812); cf. TREUE, supra note 3, at 
162 (noting lack of big-scale plundering of art in Germany and Austria since the 
sack of Prague).  
 82 Zhang, supra note 39, at para. 32 (noting the abandonment from looting 
“starting with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648”). 
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loot. 83   Indeed, this new usage resulted from a change in the 
perception of justice and reasonableness that restricted the 
traditional right of conquest.84   
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many classical 
international law writers sought to limit the damages of war and 
thus placed more restrictions on the right of conquest.85  According 
to these jurists, it was just war and just cause that determined the 
treatment of an enemy’s property.86  These jurists further related just 
cause to military necessity in the determination of what type of 
property could be seized. 87   Sacred objects and works of art 
especially were considered exceptions to the rules regarding the 
spoils of war.  As Grotius emphasized, it was not necessary to use 
force upon artifacts that posed no danger to an army in a war but 
actually honored human society, such as temples and sacred 
objects. 88   de Vattel further articulated that objects that did not 
increase the enemy’s strength but honored human society should be 
excluded from spoils of war, including temples, tombs, public 
buildings, and all remarkable works of art.89   
Grotius’ and de Vattel’s reasoning about the treatment of 
cultural artifacts during warfare reflected an updated 
understanding of the law of nature regarding the right of conquest.  
These writers’ opinions were rooted in the development of civil 
society, which increasingly appreciated special values of cultural 
artifacts during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  As early 
as 70 BCE, the influential Roman jurist Marcus T. Cicero developed 
a philosophy about the fate of works of art when he prosecuted 
Governor Verres, who abused his authority by plundering artistic 
 
 83 Id. at ¶ 33. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25, at 35-44 (illustrating the rise of art’s status 
during the Renaissance and how writers sough to protect art from harms of wars). 
 86 HUGO GROTIUS, COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY 89 (Martine 
Julia van Ittersum ed., Liberty Fund 2006); see 2 BELLI, supra note 52, at 131 (stating 
that "cities ought not to be plundered except for some great wrong and crime."); 
WOLFF, supra note 58, at 402 §778. 
 87 2 ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRI TRES [THREE BOOKS ON THE LAW OF 
WAR] 270, 275 (Clarendon Press 1933); PUFENDORF, supra note 57, at 166, 245, 256; 
WOLFF, supra note 58, at 426-27 §§823-825 (discussing the “allowable destruction” 
in just wars). 
 88 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES [THREE BOOKS ON THE 
LAW OF WAR AND PEACE] 751, para. V (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (articulating 
when “devastation should be refrained” during war). 
 89  DE VATTEL, supra note 64, at §168 (noting the justice and power of 
distributive justice). 
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treasures.90  Cicero strongly emphasized the cultural value of works 
of art instead of merely focusing on their economic or religious 
value. 91   Moreover, Cicero viewed these artifacts as absolutely 
essential to the life of a given people, arguing that cultural artifacts 
should be preserved in their original surroundings.92  Cicero’s views 
did not draw much attention in his own time.  However, in later 
centuries, the Renaissance enhanced the cultural impact of art in the 
development of humanism and thus ignited people’s appreciation 
for cultural artifacts. 93   Cicero’s writings about the indisputable 
value of cultural artifacts to their territories of origin were then 
revived, serving as a vital precedent in debates about the ethical 
principles of collecting works of art.94  Cicero’s arguments provided 
the philosophical basis not only for the emerging customary rule 
that prohibited plunder, but also required returning plundered 
artifacts to their territories of origin.95  Moreover, the ideologies of 
the Enlightenment promoted classical international law jurists to 
frame the law of nations by the use of reason.96   The looting of 
cultural artifacts could thus no longer be regarded as a natural right 
of conquest, because such practices were not considered a necessity 
for sovereigns to engage in or sustain a war.  These changes all 
impacted the understandings of classical international law jurists 
about the law of nature regarding the right of conquest and 
especially the treatment of property.   
The new usage that refrained from plundering each other’s 
cultural artifacts, in conformity with the law of nature that restricted 
the right of conquest by military necessity, clearly manifested in the 
CIL rule that prohibited wartime looting of cultural property which 
was established at the end of the eighteenth century.  Admittedly, 
this usage mostly appeared in Europe during this period.  However, 
as Grotius emphasized, the law of nature was generally applied to 
all nations, because it represented “the common sense of 
 
 90 See MILES, ART AS PLUNDER, supra note 3, at 2-3. 
 91 Id. at 363-64. 
 92 Cicero Comments on the Impact on Foreign Envoys to Rome of Verres’ Plundered 
Art from Asia Minor, in MILES, ART AS PLUNDER, supra note 3, at 363-64; Cicero 
Comments on Scipio Aemilianus Repatriation of Art Booty from Carthage to Sicilian Cities, 
in MILES, ART AS PLUNDER, supra note 3, at 366-67. 
 93 Nahlik, supra note 37, at 1071. 
 94 MILES, ART AS PLUNDER, supra note 3, at 8. 
 95 Zhang, supra note 39, at para. 31. 
 96  See generally SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25, at 40-44 (describing the 
Enlightenment Era’s impact on use of reason in international law). 
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mankind.” 97   The CIL rule against wartime plunder of cultural 
property based on the usage thus had a universal application 
because of the universal law of nature, even though the practices in 
conformity therewith were more common in Europe.   
b. The Development of the CIL Rule Against Plunder in the Nineteenth 
Century 
Although the CIL rule against plunder was established at the 
end of the eighteenth century, this rule might have been modified or 
abandoned due to the dynamic nature of CIL.  This section thus 
explores two issues.  It first inquires as to what was the legal test to 
identify the continuous validity of CIL rules that were previously 
established, especially when the law of nations shifted its 
philosophy away from natural law and toward positivism.  It then 
applies this test to analyze whether the CIL rule against plunder was 
still valid during the nineteenth century.   
i. The Approach to Identify the Validity of CIL Rules as 
Previously Established 
The history of the nineteenth century witnessed the fundamental 
shift within the philosophy of international law from natural law 
toward positivism.  This shift was not a sudden change but occurred 
gradually during that century.  The question then arises as to how 
to evaluate the validity of CIL rules during the transitional period 
when natural law was being replaced with positivism.  During this 
transitional period, the law of nature and state consent closely 
interacted with each other and mutually constituted the basis of CIL.  
State consent played an increasing role in identifying CIL at that 
time, which was primarily presumed to exist based on consistent 
state practices. 98   However, the law of nature should not be 
neglected.  Many influential jurists in the nineteenth century still 
 
 97 GROTIUS, supra note 88, at 42. 
 98 See, e.g., N. Atl. Coast Fisheries (U.K. v. U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. 167, 206 (Perm. Ct. 
Arb. 1910) (Draco, J., dissenting); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); 
Regina v. Keyn (The Franconia), 2 Exch. Div. 63, 202 (Lord Cockburn C.J. 1876) (“To 
be binding, the law must have received the assent of the nations who are to be 
bound by it.”); David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History 
of an Illusion, 65 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 385, 398 (1996). 
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regarded the law of nature as the essential basis that determined the 
binding force of CIL.99  Henry Maine in particular pointed out that 
“[t]he most useful and practical part of the Law of Nations is, no 
doubt, instituted or positive law, founded on usage, consent, and 
agreement. But it would be improper to separate this law entirely 
from natural jurisprudence.”100  Wheaton also defined international 
law from the perspective of both natural law and positivism.101  The 
law of nature especially served as an essential basis to develop state 
consent in codifying the laws and customs of war during the second 
half of the nineteenth century.  Francis Lieber, who initiated this 
effort by drafting the Lieber Code for the U.S. government in 1863, 
observed that rules were created through “[u]sage, history, reason, 
and conscientiousness, a sincere love of truth, justice and 
civilization.”102  His work strongly encouraged states to codify the 
law of war and indeed provided the material basis for the Brussels 
Declaration of 1874, the Oxford Manuals of 1880, and the Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907.103  As the preambles of the Hague 
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 revealed, justice and reason were two 
of the main foundations in drafting these agreements.104  
Meanwhile, the opinions of states began to draw increasing 
attention to identifying CIL rules.105  These opinions of states may 
 
  99 JAMES BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 69 (Oxford Univ. Press 7th ed. 2012) 
(ebook) (quoting Lord Mansfield, “the law of nations is founded on justice, equity, 
convenience, and the reason of the thing, and confirmed by long usage.”).  Henry 
Halleck and James Lorimer also contended that it was the law of nature that made 
custom, usage and practice legally binding.  H. W. HALLECK, ELEMENTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LAWS OF WAR 32 (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co. 
1878); 1 JAMES LORIMER, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 19, 27 (Edinburgh, 
William Blackwood & Sons 1883). 
 100 Maine, supra note 67, at 32. 
 101 WHEATON & PHILLIPSON, supra note 69, at 22. 
 102 RICHARD S. HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 10 (1983). 
 103 Zhang, supra note 39, at paras. 56-72. 
 104 1899 Hague Conventions, supra note 21; 1907 Hague Conventions, supra 
note 21.  
 105  See, e.g., LEWIS R. HARLEY, FRANCIS LIEBER, HIS LIFE AND POLITICAL 
PHILOSOPHY 153 (New York, Columbia Univ. Press 1899) (providing testimony that 
the Lieber Code was drafted on the grounds of “the legal consciousness of civilized 
peoples.”); SCHLUTTER, supra note 65, at 16 (arguing from Austin’s perspective that 
international law was a framework “which [is] imposed upon nations or sovereigns 
by opinions current amongst nations.”); Th. Baty, The Institute of International Law 
on Pacific Blockade, 21 L. MAG. & L. REV. 285 (1896) (arguing that the opinions of 
nations laid the foundation for international law and made the rules valid to 
nations); WHEATON & PHILLIPSON, supra note 69, at 90 (concluding that the usage 
and opinion of nations generally recognized that the right of intervention or 
interference was an incontrovertible right of sovereignty). 
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serve as convincing proof that how states understood the law of 
nature, or can be used as a basis to develop state consent. 106  
Although the three theories are in tension with one another in legal 
philosophy, the law of nature, state consent, and the opinions of 
state “all played a significant role in developing customary 
international law during this period, but with different degrees of 
significance.”107  Accordingly, to test the validity of established CIL 
rules in the nineteenth century one must depend on an overall 
evaluation of the law of nature, state consent, and the opinions of 
states in a dynamic context.  
ii. The CIL Rule Against Plunder Remained Valid 
The nineteenth century provides two episodes for the 
investigation of whether the CIL rule that prohibited wartime 
plunder of cultural artifact remained valid during this period.  
1. Napoleon’s Looting and the Development of the CIL Rule 
Against Plunder 
In the first case study, Napoleon conducted a systematic and 
organized looting of cultural property in Europe for nearly two 
decades.108  Because Napoleon’s looting deviated dramatically from 
the CIL rule against such practices, this substantial deviation could 
have cast doubt on the validity of this rule at that time.  
However, the CIL rule that prohibited wartime plunder of 
cultural property was, instead of being weakened, strengthened as 
a result of Napoleon’s looting.  Napoleon attempted to conceal his 
organized confiscation of cultural artifacts during his campaign in 
Belgium in 1794, which suggested that Napoleon knew that the right 
of conquest during that time did not permit the systematic looting 
 
 106 Zhang, supra note 39, at para. 14. 
 107 Id. 
 108  For background on how Napoleon conducted an immense plunder of 
cultural artifacts in Europe, see generally CECIL GOULD, TROPHY OF CONQUEST, THE 
MUSÉE NAPOLÉON AND THE CREATION OF THE LOUVRE (1965); Patricia Mainardi, 
Assuring the Empire of the Future: The 1798 Fête de la Liberté, 48 ART J. 155 (1989); 
Dorothy M. Quynn, The Art Confiscations of the Napoleonic Wars, 50 AM. HIST. REV. 
437 (1945).   
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of cultural artifacts anymore.109  Napoleon, nevertheless, sought to 
abandon this restriction by using force to revive the Roman practice 
of looting.  However, Napoleon’s looting provoked strong 
condemnations across Europe and even within France. 110   These 
public reactions, for the first time, were so forceful as to raise serious 
doubts about the legality of such looting, which convincingly 
suggests that “modern civilization was no longer tolerant of such a 
practice.”111  
More significantly, the CIL rule that prohibited Napoleon’s 
looting was strengthened by the critical responses of European 
sovereigns to his looting as being contrary to “every principle of 
justice and the usages of modern warfare.” 112   These responses 
represented their respective states’ opinions, which clearly reflected 
their views of the law of nature that underlay the justice and usages 
of modern warfare.  On this basis, European sovereigns consented 
to return plundered artifacts to their territories of origin after 
Napoleon’s final defeat. 113   These acts of restitution not only 
confirmed the existence of the international obligation that 
prohibited such plunder but also developed this CIL rule by 
recognizing restitution as the primary remedy for its violation.114  
2. Codification of the Established CIL Rule Against Plunder 
States attempted to codify the laws and customs of war during 
the second half of the nineteenth century.  The rule against wartime 
plunder of cultural property, inter alia, was included in these efforts.  
It started with the Lieber Code, which required in Articles 34-36 and 
38 that monuments of art, religious temples, churches, and libraries 
should be spared unless the standard of military necessity was 
met.115   Article 35 especially called for the protection of classical 
works of art and libraries, “even when they are contained in fortified 
 
 109 Zhang, supra note 39, at paras. 41-42. 
 110 Id. at paras. 43-46. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. at paras. 47-50 (quoting Viscount Castlereagh from infra note 153). 
 113 See discussion infra Section IV.a.4.  
 114 See discussion infra Section IV.a.5. 
 115 Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field 
General Order No. 100, art. 34-36, 38 (War Dep’t Apr. 14, 1863), reprinted in 3 THE 
WAR OF THE REBELLION 148 (1902) [hereinafter the Lieber Code]. 
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places whilst besieged or bombarded.”116  Compared to the Lieber 
Code, the Brussels Declaration had a stricter rule, which stated in 
Articles 8 and 38 that military necessity was not considered an 
exception for confiscation of property belonging to churches and 
museums of fine art.117  Article 53 of the Oxford Manual offered the 
strictest rule, stating, “All destruction or wilful damage to 
institutions of this character, historic monuments, archives, Works 
of art, or science, is formally forbidden, save when urgently 
demanded by military necessity.” 118   The Hague Conventions of 
1899 and 1907 followed the stipulation of the Brussels Declaration in 
their Conventions. 119   The two Conventions also stated that 
competent authorities should prosecute perpetrators who 
conducted illicit confiscation.120   This provision was copied from 
Article 8 of the Brussels Declaration, which required that all seizure 
of institutions of religion or art, historic monuments and works of 
art “should be made the subject of [legal proceedings] by the 
competent authorities.”121  Later, the Nuremberg tribunal relied on 
the provisions in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 to 
prosecute war criminals who illegally confiscated works of art 
during World War II.122 
As many nineteenth-century jurists observed, international 
agreements at that time may merely formalize the established CIL 
rules.123  The Nuremberg tribunal also confirmed, “[I]n many cases 
treaties do no more than express and define for more accurate 
reference the principles of law already existing.”124  The Lieber Code 
was not merely a U.S. martial law but rather a reflection of the 
 
 116 Id. at art. 35. 
 117 Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs 
of War, adopted by the Conference of Brussels art. 8, 38, Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted in 
1 AM. J. INT’L L. 96 (1907) [hereinafter the Brussels Declaration]. 
 118 Institute De Droit International, Les Lois De La Guerre Sur Terre [The Laws 
of War in Land] art. 53, (Sept. 9, 1880) [hereinafter the Oxford Manual of 1880]. 
 119 See The 1899 Hague Conventions, supra note 21, at art. 46, 56; The 1907 
Hague Conventions, supra note 21, at art. 46, 56; 
 120 The 1899 Hague Conventions, supra note 21, at art. 56, (“All seizure of . . . 
such institutions, to historical monuments, works of art or science, is prohibited, 
and should be made the subject of [legal] proceedings.”). 
 121 The Brussels Declaration, supra note 117, at art. 8. 
 122 See infra text accompanying note 136. 
 123 WHEATON & PHILLIPSON, supra note 69, at 24; WILSON & TUCKER, supra note 
67, at 88-89; PHILLIMORE, supra note 78, at 86. 
 124 Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (Oct. 1, 1946), 
reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 219 (1947). 
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established law of war; as Article 4 stipulated, “Martial Law is 
simply military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and 
usages of war.” 125   Fedor F. Marten, who drafted the Brussels 
Declaration, described the conference as “in a sense the natural 
development of a thought, which has long been recognized as 
just.” 126   As the preamble stated, the Oxford Manual sought to 
observe the law of war by “codifying the accepted ideas of our age 
so far as this has appeared allowable and practicable.” 127   Most 
provisions in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 also merely 
restated international law rather than amending it,128 including the 
rule against the plunder of cultural property.  As the records reveal, 
there was a clear consensus about the drafting of Article 56 without 
any debates throughout all the meetings of both conferences.129  The 
context of Article 56 was thus unanimously adopted in conformity 
with the wording of the Brussels Declaration with only minor 
changes in expression.130   
As this history shows, while these international agreements 
were formalized through state consent, this consent reflected a 
common understanding of established CIL rules at the time.  The 
states’ opinions were based on their observance of the law of nature 
as one of the foundations for these rules.  In particular, the CIL rule 
against plunder was not created at that time by state consent, but 
rather, it was already established on a natural law basis.  States 
recognized the existence of this rule and then accepted it by 
expressing their consent.  The CIL rule against plunder thus 
 
 125 The Lieber Code, supra note 115, at art. 4 (establishing that the Code is a 
reflection of existing law of war in its title “Code for the Government of Armies in 
the Field as Authorized by the Laws and Usages of War on Land”) (emphasis added). 
 126 FEDOR F. MARTENS, LA PAIX ET LA GUERRE: LA CONFÉRENCE DE BRUXELLES 1874 
[PEACE AND WAR: THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE OF 1874] 76 (1901) (quoting as 
translated by the author of this article). 
 127 The Oxford Manual of 1880, supra note 118, at preface. 
 128 See generally The 1899 Hague Conventions, supra note 21 (preamble); The 
1907 Hague Conventions, supra note 21 (preamble); 1 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES (THE CONFERENCE OF 1899) 272 (James Brown Scott ed., 
1920); THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, at xi (James 
Brown Scott ed., 2d ed. 1915); Hague Conventions (1899, 1907), supra note 26; 
WHEATON & PHILLIPSON, supra note 69, at 25. 
 129  See THE CONFERENCE OF 1899, supra note 128, at 77, 261, 442; 1 THE 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES: THE CONFERENCE OF 1907 631 
(James Brown Scott ed., 1920); 3 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE 
CONFERENCES:  THE CONFERENCE OF 1907 239, 1054 (James Brown Scott ed., 1920). 
 130 MARTENS, supra note 126, at 546, 563-64. 
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remained continuously valid even though the philosophy of 
international law changed.131   
c. The Development of the CIL Rule Against Plunder in the Twentieth 
Century 
Positivism was well established as the primary foundation of the 
philosophy of international law throughout the twentieth century.132  
Under this philosophy, the conventional approach to identifying 
CIL rules requires general state practice and opinio juris.  In this 
approach, it is broadly agreed that once a CIL rule has been 
established, unilateral withdrawal from the rule by any state is 
usually not allowed.133   Subsequent practices which prove to be 
inconsistent with the established CIL rules are thus generally 
considered a breach of the rules, until these rules are ultimately 
modified or abandoned by subsequent inconsistent practices over a 
period of time.134   
During the twentieth century, the two World Wars provided 
significant occasions for examining the validity of this CIL rule 
through the lens of practices that substantially diverged from the 
 
 131 Zhang, supra note 39, at paras. 69-73. 
 132 Kennedy, supra note 98, at 398. 
 133  International Law Association, Statement of Principles Applicable to the 
Formation of General Customary International Law, 69 ILA Report of Conference 27 
(2000):  
There is fairly widespread agreement that, even if there is a persistent 
objector rule in international law, it applies only when the customary rule 
is in the process of emerging. It does not, therefore, benefit States which 
came into existence only after the rule matured, or which became involved 
in the activity in question only at a later stage. Still less can it be invoked 
by those who existed at the time and were already engaged in the activity 
which is the subject of the rule, but failed to object at that stage. In other 
words, there is no “subsequent objector” rule. 
 134 See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. 
v. U.S.), supra note 31, at para. 186 (“In order to deduce the existence of customary 
rules, the Court deems it sufficient that . . . instances of state conduct inconsistent 
with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as 
indications of the recognition of a new rule.”); K. Wolfke, Some Persistent 
Controversies Regarding Customary International Law, 24 Neth. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 7-8 
(1993); MAURICE H. MENDELSON, THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 174-75 (1998) (stating “established customary rules are rarely simply 
abolished: they are normally replaced by other rules.”); MARK E. VILLIGER, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 48 (1985) (“As long as the previous 
opinio has not been eroded, and the new opinio is not established, the diverging 
practice remains a form either of persistent or subsequent objection.”). 
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law.  Instead of being eroded, this CIL rule was strengthened by 
states’ efforts to safeguard cultural artifacts from being removed 
during warfare.135  Acts of restitution after the two World Wars also 
developed this CIL rule by confirming that restitution was the 
primary remedy for violations of the law.  Moreover, the looting of 
cultural property has been recognized as a war crime since the 
Nuremberg trials.  During the trial of Alfred Rosenberg, who was 
notoriously known as the head of Nazi Special Task Force 
“Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg” dedicated to the plunder of 
cultural artifacts, the International Military Tribunal found 
Rosenberg guilty of “looting cultural property in occupied 
territories” on the basis of Article 56 of the Hague Conventions of 
1899 and 1907, and viewed this article, inter alia, as deriving from 
CIL that was recognized by all civilized nations. 136   During this 
period, states further developed this rule through consistent efforts 
to conclude a special convention devoted to the protection of 
cultural property in war, which finally brought the 1954 Hague 
Convention and its first protocol to convene.137   
IV. RESTITUTION: REMEDY FOR THE BREACH OF THE CIL RULE 
AGAINST PLUNDER 
This part investigates how restitution has been established as the 
primary remedy for violations of the CIL rule that prohibits wartime 
plunder of cultural property.  Because violations of CIL rules 
provide occasions for examining the proper remedy under CIL, this 
investigation pays close attention to the instances of looting that 
occurred during Napoleon’s reign and the two World Wars.  Given 
that the history regarding wars and peace negotiations was an 
essential source of the law of nations at that time, 138  this part 
especially investigates the history of how states negotiated, 
consented to, and enforced restitution in these circumstances.   
 
 135 Zhang, supra note 39, at paras. 75-77. 
 136 Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, supra note 
124, at 235, 237-38, 282. 
 137 Zhang, supra note 39, at paras. 81-85. 
 138 See WHEATON & PHILLIPSON, supra note 69, at 22-31 (listing the history of 
wars and peace negotiations as one of the six sources of international law). 
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a. Restitution After Napoleon’s Defeat 
There is some skepticism as to whether the outcome in favor of 
restitution after Napoleon’s final defeat simply reflects the 
traditional right of conquest.  This section shows that these acts of 
restitution were not arbitrary conclusions made by victorious 
powers, but an expression of the existing CIL, which regarded 
restitution as the only appropriate remedy for the breach of the 
established CIL rule against wartime looting of cultural artifacts.   
i. Dilemma on Restitution 
After Napoleon was first defeated in April 1814, the allied 
powers expressed divergent attitudes toward how they should deal 
with Napoleon’s plundered artifacts.139  A group of victim states 
supported restitution, while Britain was reluctant to push this claim 
forward, and Russia was opposed to it because Britain and Russia 
worried that restitution might harm the political stability of the 
newly restored French monarchy.140  The French government took 
advantage of the allied powers’ disagreement and strongly opposed 
the restitution claims.141  As a result, the first Treaty of Paris, signed 
on May 30, 1814, was silent on the return of plundered artifacts.142   
However, Napoleon’s return and his final defeat at Waterloo 
gave rise to a complete change in these circumstances and broke the 
impasse regarding restitution among the allied powers.  The allied 
powers then began to negotiate matters regarding restitution. 143  
Meanwhile, the French government continued to protest against 
such matters partly on the grounds that many plundered artifacts 
already belonged to France as a result of existing treaties. 144  
However, given their coercive nature, these treaties could not grant 
the ownership of looted artifacts to France, as it was an established 
principle of international law that coerced treaties were unable to 
 
 139 TREUE, supra note 3, at 187–88. 
 140  SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25, at 57-58; Quynn, supra note 108, at 459-60. 
 141 TREUE, supra note 3, at 187. 
 142 Letter from The Duke of Wellington to Viscount Castlereagh (Sept. 23, 
1815), in 3 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1815-1816, at 207, 209 (London, James 
Ridgway & Sons, Picadilly 1838) (1815). 
 143 Id. at 207. 
 144 SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25, at 53-55. 
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transfer the valid titles of property.145  France also claimed that the 
right of conquest during the time of Napoleon’s rule permitted 
France to retain the artifacts that were not formally transferred by 
treaties.146  This debate raises an essential question as to what the 
legal basis was for the allied powers to regain their lost artifacts.  In 
other words, did the restitution actions after the final defeat of 
Napoleon reflect another vicious cycle of exercising victorious 
power? 
ii. The Legal Grounds for Claiming Restitution 
During Napoleon’s rule, Napoleon’s extensive looting provoked 
strong condemnation from outside and even within France. 147  
Among all critics, Quatremère de Quincy, a prominent French 
archaeologist at the time, argued that these artifacts should not be 
removed because their artistic and historical value could only be 
fully appreciated in their original surroundings.148  Quatremère also 
argued that traditional Roman right of conquest had been 
abandoned by the eighteenth-century law of war and should not be 
revived149  Quatremère later petitioned the French government to 
stop confiscating these artifacts, which intensified the public debate 
on the legality of Napoleon’s confiscation.  Forty-seven of the most 
distinguished French artists at the time signed the petition against 
Napoleon’s looting, while another group of thirty-seven less-
distinguished artists soon after sent a counter-petition defending the 
French government’s looting on the grounds of the traditional right 
of conquest.150  Although Quatremère’s arguments and the public 
debate did not stop Napoleon’s looting, Quatremère’s idea and its 
circulation in European civil society prepared the philosophical 
basis for the restitution of plundered cultural artifacts to their 
territories of origin after Napoleon was defeated.   
After Napoleon was finally defeated and during the peace 
negotiations in Paris, the allied powers sought to “discover a mode 
 
 145 Marchisotto, supra note 38, at 694; SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25, at 61-62. 
 146 SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25, at 53-55. 
 147 Zhang, supra note 39, at paras. 43-46. 
 148 TREUE, supra note 3, at 178. 
 149 Mainardi, supra note 108, at 156. 
 150 Id. 
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of doing justice” regarding Napoleon’s looting.151  In this process, 
two British diplomats played a central role in developing a 
consensus about restitution.  One figure was the Duke of 
Wellington, the commander who defeated Napoleon at Waterloo 
and the lead British diplomat in Paris.  He supported the restitution 
of stolen artistic treasures to their countries of origin on the grounds 
that Napoleon’s looting violated the law of war.152  The other figure 
was Lord Castlereagh, the British diplomat to the Congress of 
Vienna, an assembly in 1814-1815 to reorganize Europe after 
Napoleon was defeated.  Agreeing with Wellington, Castlereagh 
argued for restitution because Napoleon’s looting was “contrary to 
every principle of justice and the usages of modern warfare.”153  
Wellington and Castlereagh’s understandings of the modern 
law of warfare confirmed that the CIL rule against plunder was 
established in the laws and customs of war at that time.  Moreover, 
their arguments reflected that the right to restitution was the 
primary remedy as a natural outcome flowing from the violation of 
this prohibitive rule.  As Castlereagh asserted, restitution of 
plundered cultural artifacts to their territories of origin was the 
“only guide to justice.”154 
iii. Reaction of the Allied Powers to Restitution 
Wellington circulated his opinion at the Paris diplomatic 
conference and received general support among other allied 
powers.155  The Prussian minister, Prince Hardenberg, soon stated 
his total agreement with the British diplomats’ reasoning. 156  
Austria, Spain, the Low Countries, the German states, the Italian 
states, and the Vatican all claimed that France had no right to retain 
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these plundered artifacts.157  They then rejected the request of the 
French government, which sought to include a clause in the second 
Treaty of Paris in 1815 to retain all the previously plundered cultural 
artifacts. 158   Wellington, on behalf of the allied powers, rejected 
another French request, which proposed to make restitution to only 
a few victim states, such as Prussia.159  As Wellington explained, he 
acted for all the allied powers and therefore was obliged to claim 
restitution for all of them.160  Castlereagh also claimed that the allied 
powers bore the duty of facilitating the restitution of  plundered 
cultural artifacts to their territories of origin.161 
The opinion held among the allied powers about their rights to 
restitution was also expressed by their tacit consent to the Dutch 
proposal to enforce restitution by the Netherlands’ own actions.  
During the peace negotiations in Paris, the Dutch representative 
intended to take action regarding restitution, since no satisfactory 
answers had come from France.162  Through Wellington, the Dutch 
representative inquired of the ministers of the allied powers 
whether they would oppose such action.163  As Wellington revealed, 
the allied powers had no objection to the Dutch proposed action.164  
The absence of objection signaled that the allied powers as a whole 
formed tacit consent to exercising the right to restitution of 
plundered cultural artifacts. 
iv. Reaction of France to Restitution 
The belief that France had no right to retain plundered cultural 
artifacts existed not only among the allied powers but was also 
expressed within France itself.  Prince Talleyrand-Périgord, the 
French representative who argued for France to retain plundered 
artifacts during the peace negotiations, admitted in his memoirs, 
“[P]erhaps the monuments of art should never have entered the 
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domain of conquest.”165  Even Napoleon himself knew that modern 
warfare no longer permitted the traditional practice of looting 
cultural artifacts.166 
The actual belief of the French government regarding the 
illegality of Napoleon’s looting explains why they opposed 
restitution during negotiations, but tacitly consented to restitution 
in practice.  For instance, Wellington sought the opinion of Louis 
XVIII, the newly restored French king, concerning which means  of 
restitution would be least offensive to him.167  Louis XVIII replied 
that he could give no order upon this matter and Wellington might 
act as he thought proper.168  In another instance, Talleyrand advised 
the director of French museums to let the Prussians start packing  
their statues and busts during Prussia’s negotiations with the 
museums. 169   Later, when Prussia attempted to remove their 
dispossessed artifacts from the Louvre but met the resistance of 
eighty French national guardsmen, the minister of the French 
National Guard instructed his men to allow the Prussian army to 
load their properties.170 
These episodes once again confirmed the general belief that 
France had no right to retain these artifacts removed as spoils of war.  
France thus fulfilled its obligation of restitution and almost all the 
victim states eventually regained their lost cultural artifacts.171  More 
significantly, the right to restitution was not only reflected in acts of 
restitution, but also confirmed in the second Treaty of Paris, signed 
on November 20, 1815, which obliged France to return the 
plundered artifacts to their former sovereigns.172  It is worth noting 
that this peace treaty came after the allied powers’ acts of restitution 
were completed.  If acts of restitution were made only after this 
peace treaty was concluded, there might be doubt as to whether 
restitution was enforced merely on the grounds of treaty clauses and 
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not identified as a general international law obligation to reparation.  
However, in this episode, restitution clauses concluded in the 
second Treaty of Paris convincingly suggests that acts of restitution 
were made on the CIL basis, which was then confirmed by peace 
treaty clauses. 
v. The CIL Right to Restitution 
As analyzed before, determining whether previously 
established CIL rules maintained their validity in the nineteenth 
century requires an overall investigation of the law of nature, state 
consent, and the opinions of state.  Wellington and Castlereagh’s 
arguments were made according to a general understanding of the 
justice and practice of modern warfare, which reflected the law of 
nature that restricted the traditional right of conquest and 
prohibited wartime plunder of cultural artifacts.  It was not a one-
sided belief representing the interests of only victorious powers or 
of victim states, but rather an opinion shared by the French 
government and neutral states that were not victims of Napoleon’s 
looting, such as Great Britain.  Based on this general belief, European 
nations, including France, agreed to make restitution.  In this sense, 
the outcome of restitution not only reflected the first-tier 
international obligation for states not to plunder cultural artifacts at 
that time, but also contributed to confirming restitution as the 
primary remedy.  The outcome in favor of restitution thus was not 
another reflection of victors’ right similar to the traditional right of 
conquest but was deeply established in the CIL of warfare.  
Although it was impracticable to gain restitution without having 
victory in war, such victory only provided the necessary means to 
enforce restitution rather than constituting the legitimate basis of 
these acts. 
The CIL obligation regarding restitution was also reflected in the 
Marquis de Somerueles case of 1812.173  In this case, Britain seized a 
ship carrying cultural artifacts owned by the U.S. Pennsylvania 
Academy of the Fine Arts as war prizes during its war with the 
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United States in 1812. 174   Judge Croke issued restitution on the 
grounds that “[t]he arts and sciences are admitted amongst all 
civilized nations, as forming an exception to the severe rights of 
warfare, and as entitled to favour and protection.”175  This case was 
determined by the British Vice-Admiralty Court of Halifax, and 
decisions of admiralty courts were considered to be one of the main 
proofs for the law of nations in the nineteenth century.176  This case 
thus serves as a significant precedent showing the established CIL 
rule against artifact plunder and CIL obligation to restitution at that 
time. 
b. The Development of the CIL Right to Restitution During and After 
World War I 
Restitution of plundered cultural artifacts to their countries of 
origin after World War I were settled through peace treaties.  This 
process began with the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 in Articles 245-
247, which obliged Germany to return plundered cultural artifacts 
to France, Belgium and other states.177  In addition to the Treaty of 
Versailles, other peace treaties also contained clauses concerning the 
restitution of looted cultural artifacts.178  As such, restitution clauses 
were not an occasional provision that only applied to Germany, but 
they remained a feature of many peace treaties arising from World 
War I. 
More significantly, treaty provisions provided that artifacts for 
restitution were not limited to plunders during World War I, but 
also included plunders during the previous wars of the eighteenth 
century.  Article 245 of the Treaty of Versailles required restitution 
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of cultural objects seized by the German authorities from France 
during the 1870–1871 war. 179   The Treaty of Trianon of 1921 in 
Article 177 obliged Hungary to return “all the records, documents 
and historical material possessed by public institutions . . . . which 
have been removed since January 1, 1868.”180  The Treaty of Riga of 
1921 in Article 11 obligated the Soviet Union and Ukraine to return 
to Poland a variety of cultural and historical objects, which had been 
seized under imperial Russian occupation since 1772 and the reign 
of Catherine the Great. 181   The Treaty of Saint Germain of 1920 
required the Austrian authorities to return a list of looted cultural 
objects to what was then the State of Czechoslovakia, including 
objects that were removed as early as 1718.182  The Treaty of Sèvres 
of 1921 demanded that Turkey restored all objects of religious, 
archaeological, historical, or artistic interest confiscated before 
August 1914 to the government of the territory from which they 
were taken.183  Although this treaty never entered into force, the lack 
of treaty obligation does not diminish the treaty’s value in reflecting 
the established CIL obligation to restitution arising from violations 
of the CIL rule against plunder.  These restitution clauses not only 
reaffirmed the existence of the laws and customs of war that 
prohibited the looting of cultural property from the eighteenth 
through nineteenth centuries, but also confirmed that restitution 
served as the primary remedy for violation of the international 
obligation against artifact plunder. 
c. The Development of the CIL Right to Restitution During and After 
World War II 
i. Broad Definition of War Plunders 
The widespread looting of cultural property that occurred 
during World War II pushed the international community to 
strengthen the CIL rule against plunder to prevent future violations.  
The Allies’ efforts to restore plundered artifacts started with the 
 
 179 The Treaty of Versailles, supra note 177, at art. 245. 
 180 The Treaty of Trianon, supra note 178, at art. 177. 
 181 Sandholtz, supra note 156, at 158. 
 182 The Treaty of Saint Germain, supra note 178, at art. 195.  
 183 The Treaty of Sèvres, supra note 178, art 422.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/3
2021] The Right to Restitution of Cultural Property Removed 1135 
London Declaration announced in 1943, which attempted to give a 
formal warning to all concerned regarding the treatment of looted 
property during the war. 184   The London Declaration was the 
founding agreement for the restitution during and after WWII and 
defined wartime plunder in a broad sense, which included every 
form of transfer of property, even transactions that were apparently 
legal in form. 185   Practices of searching for looted artifacts and 
returning them to their territories of origin all followed this 
agreement.186  The United States, Great Britain, and France, along 
with the Federal Republic of Germany, signed the Bonn Convention 
in 1952. 187   This convention further clarified the scope of what 
constitutes plunder to include taking under duress, larceny, 
requisitioning, and other forms of dispossession. 188   More 
extensively, cultural artifacts acquired as gifts would also be subject 
to restoration if those artifacts were obtained by use of duress or an 
individual’s official position. 189   Cultural artifacts acquired by 
purchase were likewise required for restitution, unless they had 
been brought into a given country for sale. 190   Such a broad 
conceptualization of plunder was later adopted by the 1954 Hague 
Convention in Article 4, which requires contracting parties to 
“prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft, 
pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed 
against cultural property.”191 
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ii. Widespread Participation in Restitution 
Placing the burden on military forces to protect cultural property 
during battles, particularly by establishing special institutions to 
send art professionals to the battlefield, became one feature of the 
law of war practiced during World War II.192  For example, the U.S. 
government set up the Roberts Commission and the Monuments, 
Fine Arts and Archives program (MFAA) in 1943 to carry out this 
mission.193  MFAA officers worked in the field to search out places 
where the German armies conceivably stored their looted artistic 
treasures and gathered information about the confiscation of artistic 
treasures by the Axis Powers.194  Similar special institutes were also 
established by the British government in the spring of 1944.195  These 
efforts not only strengthened the international obligation against 
plunder but also prepared for the restitution of looted artifacts after 
the war. 
State practices of returning plundered artifacts after the war 
were widespread across the world.  In Germany, restitution was first 
enacted through regulations and programs by the Allied Control 
Authority and military governments in different military zones until 
1952.196  For example, Law 52 was adopted in September 1944, which 
banned transactions concerning all objects of cultural or historical 
value, irrespective of ownership.197  This regulation also required 
those who had custody of cultural property to carry out specific 
responsibilities, such as preserving and keeping records regarding 
those objects.198  Directive 1067, which was passed in July 1945 to 
further implement Law 52, instructed the military government in 
the U.S. zone of Germany (MGUS) to seize or block the transfer of 
“works of art or cultural material of value or importance, regardless 
of the ownership thereof.”199  The MGUS then set up a unilateral 
stopgap program in September 1945 for the return of stolen works 
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of art, among other plundered properties.200  Meanwhile, uniform 
procedures were approved in 1945 for the restitution of cultural 
objects discovered in Germany that had been removed from 
formerly German-occupied countries.201  These programs, as well as 
the agreement on a definition of restitution, accelerated the process 
of restitution.202  Since 1952, the duty to continuously search for and 
return artifacts plundered during Germany’s occupation of any 
territory was shifted from the Allied Control Authority and military 
governments to the Federal Republic of Germany through the Bonn 
Convention.203 
In Austria, the Allied powers adopted similar restitution laws 
and regulations as they did in Germany.204   After the Treaty on 
Reconstructing an Independent and Democratic Austria was 
concluded in 1955, the duty shifted to the Austrian government to 
restore all dispossessed artifacts that were presently in Austria.205 
The restitution of looted artifacts discovered in Bulgaria, 
Hungary, Italy, and Romania was made through armistice and 
peace-treaty provisions.  This process started with the Act of 
Surrender of Italy of 1943, which ordered the seizure of all property 
in Italy belonging to the Allied Nations, occupied countries, or their 
nationals. 206   After that, armistice agreements with Hungary, 
Bulgaria, Finland, and Romania all included provisions to return 
artistic treasures that had been plundered by Axis powers and 
agencies during the Axis powers’ occupation of these territories.207  
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These armistice provisions were later confirmed by peace treaties 
with Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland, and Romania. 208   These 
peace treaty clauses clearly referred to the mutual understanding of 
plunder and restitution adopted by the London Declaration.209  
In Japan, the Allied powers appointed the Far Eastern 
Commission to be in charge of the restitution of looted artifacts to 
the government of the countries from which these artifacts were 
removed.210  According to the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for 
Japan issued in 1945, “Full and prompt restitution will be required 
of all identifiable looted property.”211  The Far Eastern Commission 
summary report on January 4, 1946 further clarified looted property 
to include “objects of historical, cultural, and artistic value.”212  In 
particular, according to the Recovery of American Property 
Confiscated by Japanese in China report that was released to the 
press on October 16, 1947, “Looted property which was removed 
from China and is discovered in Japan is to be delivered by the 
Allied Military Authorities in Japan to the Chinese Government.”213 
As for neutral states, any transfer of looted artifacts to or within 
these countries would be invalid according to the London 
Declaration.214  The final act of the United Nations Monetary and 
Financial Conference of 1944 followed this principle and required 
neutral states to take immediate measures to prevent any 
disposition or transfer of plundered property or concealment of 
property by fraudulent means within their territories.215  The United 
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States, France, and Britain concluded the agreement on the control 
of looted works of art on July 8, 1946, in order to make joint efforts 
to escalate the search for and restoration of plundered cultural 
treasures located within neutral states.216  Switzerland signed the 
Currie Protocol on April 8, 1945, which obliged the Swiss to pass a 
law to enforce the restitution of plundered artifacts.217  Switzerland 
thus adopted the law on December 10, 1945, and established a 
special procedure to sort out claims for restitution of looted 
properties.218  Sweden likewise enacted the Looted Objects Law in 
1945, which placed a stricter responsibility on the government to 
enforce restitution and obliged the State Treasury to pay the amount 
due to Swedish citizens who qualified as good-faith purchasers.219 
These efforts to facilitate restitution were not limited to states in 
Europe and Asia that had engaged in military actions during World 
War II.  The Resolution of the Mexican Delegation Dealing with the 
Problems of Looted and Enemy Property delivered on March 2, 
1945, represented joint efforts of American states in promoting the 
restitution of artifacts plundered by Germany and Japan to their 
countries of origin.220  
V. A GENERAL OR EUROPEAN CIL RIGHT TO RESTITUTION? 
This Part examines the scope of the application of the CIL Right 
to Restitution in two sections.  First, it inquires whether the CIL right 
to restitution was a general CIL rule or a mere European custom, 
because state practices in law-making were more often shown in 
Europe before the twentieth century.  Second, it investigates 
whether the so-called standard of civilized nations, which was 
articulated to exclude non-Western nations from participating in 
international society in the nineteenth century, would prevent the 
CIL right to restitution from applying to non-Western nations.  
These discussions will impact whether claims for restitution can be 
established today for states that suffered the looting of cultural 
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property during nineteenth-century warfare to recover these 
artifacts. 
a. The Evolution and Application of the Law of War 
There likely exists some doubt as to whether the CIL right to 
restitution was a general CIL rule or merely a European custom 
because European states engaged in law-making practices more 
frequently before the twentieth century.  Admittedly, the acts of 
refraining from confiscating cultural objects as spoils of war and 
restitution afterwards were distinctively European practices.  
However, the essential issue is whether the customary law of 
nations underlying these practices had or should be deemed to have 
had a universal application at that time.  Since applying the current 
law-making rules would violate the non-retroactivity principle, it is 
thus necessary to use the contemporaneous law-making criteria for 
this inquiry. 
As this article investigates, mandatory customary law of nations 
existed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which 
required both usages and adherence to the law of nature.  Usages 
could be merely European practices, but the law of nature was 
considered to apply to all nations, including non-European nations 
at that time.221  The universal law of nature was especially applied 
in the law of war.  As Judge Lord Stowell observed, within the law 
of nations, although the rules of trade did not apply to the regions 
outside of Europe, the basic rules of war had a universal application 
to all nations.222  The CIL rules prohibiting plunder and providing 
restitution as the remedy for violations of the rule, which were 
established in the law of war at the end of the eighteenth century 
under natural law, were thus considered general CIL rules that 
applied to all nations. 
During the nineteenth century, the theoretical basis of 
international law was a mix of the law of nature and state consent, 
which gives a new examination of the evolution of the CIL rule 
against plunder as well as the right to restitution.  In the 
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circumstances of Napoleon’s looting, this rule was not eroded but 
indeed strengthened, as demonstrated by the means of his looting, 
the public sentiment, and the reactions from other states to his acts.  
Although state consent to restitution after Napoleon’s defeat was 
made only by European sovereigns, such consent was a clear 
reflection of the universal law of nature that prohibited wartime 
plunder of cultural artifacts. 223   Castlereagh also argued that 
Napoleon’s looting was “contrary to every principle of justice, and 
to the usages of modern warfare.”224  “Modern” in this sentence was 
a plain interpretation of time rather than a limitation on regions. 
Codification of the laws and customs of war by a series of 
international agreements in the second half of the nineteenth 
century provides another example showing that the CIL rule against 
plunder was applied to all nations.  As the history of war repeatedly 
demonstrated, military parties participating in warfare often failed 
to faithfully obey the law of war in the form of CIL.225  Inspired by 
Lieber’s model, European states began to recognize the necessity of 
having state consent regarding common understandings of military 
rules, so that these rules would be better executed in military 
practices.226  This shared opinion led to the convening of the Brussels 
Conference, the publication of the Oxford Manual, and finally the 
adoption of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which all 
included the codification of the CIL rule against plunder.  As this 
history reveals, state consent was not adopted to create new rules of 
warfare, but rather, as a means to strengthen the binding basis of 
existing rules that were previously established on a natural law basis 
with universal application.  The CIL rule against plunder thus 
remained universally valid even though the philosophy of 
international law shifted away from natural law toward positivism. 
 
 223 See discussion supra Section IV.A.5. 
 224 Supra note 153, at 204. 
 225 MARTENS, supra note 126, at 79-80. 
 226 Id. at 73-75, 91, 95-96, 98-99. 
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b. The So-Called Standard of Civilized Nations and Disputes over 
Spoils of War 
All states are considered civilized today. 227   During the 
nineteenth century, however, colonial powers framed the standard 
of civilized nations to exclude non-Western nations from 
participating in international society.228  The connection between the 
standard of civilized nations and disputes over spoils of war thus 
raises a complexity in the application of international law, i.e., 
whether the CIL rule against plunder and the right to restitution 
could be applied to non-Western nations at that time. 229   In this 
section, I first explore the evolution of the standard of civilized 
nations in history and then inquire as to the actual application of the 
law of war in military practices, taking the two Opium Wars (1840-
1860) as an example.  I argue that the standard of civilized nations 
was adopted in international law as a criterion for Western nations 
to enjoy international law-making powers, rather than to exclude 
 
 227 The standard of civilization no longer exerts legal significance in making 
or applying the rules of international law.  HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 n.1 (1947) (“Modern international law knows of no 
distinction, for the purposes of recognition, between civilized and uncivilized States 
or between States within and outside the international community of civilized 
States”); 2 SIENHO YEE, We Are All “Civilized Nations”: Arguments for Cleaning Up 
Article 38 (1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in TOWARDS AN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CO-PROGRESSIVENESS 21-35 (2014). 
 228  For more information on how the standard of civilized nations was 
employed to exclude non-Western nations from participating in international 
society, see generally Liliana O. Tarazona, The Civilized and the Uncivilized, in THE 
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 917, 938 (Bardo 
Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2012) (“In the 19th century, civilization became the 
new a priori claim to European expansion based on an accepted way to classify the 
progress of peoples or States through a range of imagined values.”); Brett Bowden, 
The Colonial Origins of International Law. European Expansion and the Classical Standard 
of Civilization, 7 J. HIST. INT'L L. 1 (2005); Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: 
Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L 
L.J. 1 (1999) (focusing on the role of positivism in dispossessing European colonies); 
Georg Schwarzenberger, The Standard of Civilisation in International Law, 8 CURRENT 
LEGAL PROBS. 212 (1955); Edward Keene, The Standard of ‘Civilisation’, the Expansion 
Thesis and the 19th-century International Social Space, 42 MILLENNIUM J. INT'L STUD. 651 
(2014); Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Idea of European International Law, 17 EUR. J. 
INT'L L. 315 (2006). 
 229  In his article, Spitra adopts the Third World Approach to International Law 
to discuss the relations between the idea of civilization in international law and the 
historical development of the protection of cultural property during warfare.  See 
Sebastian Spitra, Civilisation, Protection, Restitution: A Critical History of International 
Cultural Heritage Law in the 19th and 20th Century, 22 J. HIST. INT’L L. 329 (2020).   
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non-Western nations from applying the law of war during the 
nineteenth century. 
i. The Concept of Civilized Nations Under Natural Law 
The term “civilized nations” was not an innovation of the 
nineteenth century but was written into the language of the law of 
nations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.230   The 
standard of civilized nations first referred to Christianity during the 
seventeenth century, but was later developed toward the use of 
reason due to the impact of the Enlightenment era during the 
eighteenth century.231  As Wolff defined, a civilized nation was “a 
cultured nation which cultivates intellectual virtues . . . . has 
civilized usages or usages which conform to the standard of reason 
and politeness.”232   In this respect, Wolff recognized China as a 
civilized nation because of its great achievements in moral 
philosophy and statecraft, despite its slower development in physics 
and mathematics than that of Europe.233 
Remarkably, classical international law writers did not regard 
the standard of civilized nations as a legal threshold to exclude non-
Western nations from applying the law of nations.  Grotius 
recognized the different progress of civilization in different peoples 
but observed a universal application of international law to all 
nations. 234   Wolff argued that all nations were equal by nature, 
regardless of their different rates of progress as civilizations.235  The 
equality of all nations was also long recognized as a fundamental 
 
 230 See, e.g., 2 GROTIUS, supra note 88, at 208 (“Hence this type of ownership, 
which by common acceptation of civilized nations has been introduced in favour of 
infants and those of similar condition”); WOLFF, supra note 58, at 17, 33. 
 231 See Tarazona, supra note 228, at 918–21. 
 232 2 WOLFF, supra note 58, at 34. 
 233 See id. at 35. 
 234 HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO 
THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE 5 (Ralph van Deman Magoffin 
trans., James Brown. Scott ed., 1916). (“For it is a law derived from nature, the 
common mother of us all, whose bounty falls on all, and whose sway extends over 
those who rule nations, and which is held most sacred by those who are most 
scrupulously just.”). 
 235 See 2 WOLFF, supra note 58, at 33-34. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,
1144 U. Pa. J. Int'l L. [Vol. 42:4 
principle in the law of nations since the Peace of Westphalia of 
1648.236   
In these writers’ views, the standard of civilized nations was not 
deemed an entrance to deny non-Western nations access to 
international society, either.  According to Wolff, an international 
society was established among all nations and bound all nations by 
nature.237  De Vattel likewise viewed that a great society of nations 
was established by nature among all nations for “the interchange of 
mutual assistance for their own improvement, and that of their 
condition.”238 
In light of this history, the standard of civilized nations was 
neither an entrance for non-Western nations joining in international 
society nor a threshold that excluded these nations from applying 
the law of war under natural law during the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. 
ii. The Changing Legal Significance of Civilized Nations in the 
Nineteenth Century 
Only beginning in the nineteenth century, “civilized nations,” a 
term which exclusively referred to those nations that inherited or 
adopted European or Christian civilization, became a threshold to 
exclude non-Western nations from membership in international 
society.239  Since then, many non-European nations, such as China, 
were labeled as uncivilized nations.240  A controversy arose among 
 
 236 Origins of Public International Law, in THE OXFORD INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY (Stanley N. Katz ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2009), 
https://www.oxfordreference.com [https://perma.cc/45DF-3TAS] (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2021).  
 237 See 2 WOLFF, supra note 58, at 11. 
 238 DE VATTEL, supra note 64, at §12 (emphasis added). 
 239 See, e.g., FEDOR F. MARTENS, VÖLKERRECHT [INTERNATIONAL LAW] 474-75, 
480-81 (Berlin, Weidmannache Buchhandlung 1883); TWISS, supra note 176, at 162; 
WILLIAM E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 42-43 (3d ed. 1890); WHEATON 
& PHILLIPSON, supra note 69, at 18.  For contemporary comments, see also Tarazona, 
supra note 228; Bowden, supra note 228, at 1. 
 240 See WHEATMAN & PHILLIPSON, supra note 69, at 20.  However, Westlake 
argued that countries such as China, Japan, and Turkey must be recognized as 
civilized nations, even though their civilizations were different from European 
models.  See THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN WESTLAKE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 102-03 (L. Oppenheim ed., 1914). 
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jurists at that time as to whether the law of war could apply to 
uncivilized nations.241 
However, what was the legal significance of the membership of 
international community during this period?  What was the 
relationship between the membership of international community 
and the subjects of international law?  Indeed, non-membership of 
international society did not necessarily deprive non-Western 
nations of the subjects of international law, because this membership 
was merely an expression of international law-making power 
during this period.  Prominent jurists, such as John Westlake and 
Theodore D. Woolsey, argued that law-making power was limited 
to nations that had inherited or adopted Western civilization. 242  
Their ideas of limiting law-making power to civilized nations were 
likely affected by Wolff, who admitted that “what has been 
approved by the more civilized nations is the law of nations.”243  
Still, what Wolff meant in his time was that civilized nations had a 
greater capacity to produce the rules for the law of nations, but all 
nations were equal in the application of these rules. 
Indeed, lack of law-making power did not necessarily exclude 
non-Western nations from applying the law of nations.  For 
example, during the parliamentary debate of Great Britain in 1840, 
a debate existed as to whether the law of nations should be applied 
to relations between Great Britain and China in the Opium War.244  
As Sir G. Staunton claimed, “Though the Chinese are no parties to 
the specific usages of international law amongst European nations, 
they cannot but be bound by that law of nations, which is founded 
 
 241 Some jurists argued that international law only applied to civilized nations 
because it was an ultimate product of their civilization.  See WHEATON & PHILLIPSON, 
supra note 69, at 14-15; LORIMER, supra note 99, at 102 (“[Civilized communities are 
not] bound to apply the positive law of nations to savages, or even to barbarians”); 
HALL, supra note 239.  However, a few scholars, such as Johann C. Bluntschli, have 
argued that international law was not restricted to the European family of nations 
but applied to all peoples on earth.  JOHANN C. BLUNTSCHLI, DAS MODERNE 
VÖLKERRECHT DER CIVILISIRTEN STATEN [THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE 
CIVILIZED STATES] para. 7 (1878). 
 242 THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN WESTLAKE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, 
supra note 240, at 103; THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW §5 (New York, Charles Scribner & Co. 1871); cf. Tarazona, supra 
note 228, at 918 (“[O]nly ‘civilized’ nations could participate in the project of 
international law.”) 
 243 2 WOLFF, supra note 58, at 17. 
 244 CORRECTED REPORT OF THE SPEECH OF SIR GEORGE STAUNTON, ON SIR JAMES 
GRAHAM’S MOTION ON THE CHINA TRADE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 11 (London, 
Edmund Lloyd, Harley Street 1840). 
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on the law of nature and of common-sense.”245  Regarding the same 
issue, John Q. Adams, former U.S. Congressman and President, 
stated in his public lecture in 1841 that the general and necessary 
law of nations should definitely apply to the contest between Great 
Britain and China, which was determined by the law of nature to 
bind the relations between independent communities. 246   These 
statements strongly suggest that the standard of civilized nations 
was not a threshold in considering whether to apply the law of war 
to non-Western nations, despite these nations’ different 
civilizations, their exclusion from the process of defining the 
positive law of nations, and even their lack of knowledge of 
international law. 
State practices of Britain and France during the two Opium Wars 
also reflected these opinions.  During the first Opium War, Queen 
Victoria issued an order on April 4, 1840, requiring British courts of 
admiralty to determine all the confiscations of any property in China 
“the same according to the course of admiralty and the laws of 
nations.”247  Likewise, during the Second Opium War, Great Britain 
and France both issued decrees ordering their armies to comply with 
the rules of maritime law under the Declaration of Paris of 1856.248  
This Declaration contained a special provision that limited its 
application only to “the Powers who have signed [the Declaration] 
or shall accede to it.”249  Great Britain and France were both parties 
to this Declaration while China was not.  However, the rules of 
maritime law under this Declaration were reflections of customary 
law of nations at that time.250  The practices of Britain and France 
clearly suggested that they believed that the customary law of 
nations also applied to the relations between Western powers and 
China, even though China was neither a member of their 
international community nor a civilized state according to their 
standard. 
Rather than denying its application to non-Western nations, the 
standard of civilized nations was indeed employed as a means to 
 
 245 Id. 
 246 John Q. Adams, Lecture on the War with China (Dec. 1841), in 11 THE 
CHINESE REPOSITORY 274, 275–76 (1842).  
 247  War with China: Order in Council, Presented to Parliament by Her 
Majesty’s Command (Apr. 4, 1840), in 9 THE CHINESE REPOSITORY 241, 244 (1840).  
 248 TWISS, supra note 176, at xxxi-xxxiii. 
 249 Id. at xxxi.  
 250  See id. at xxxii (noting that the Declaration of Paris was to be “less 
burdensome to Neutrals”).  
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promote the universal application of the law of war.  As Wheaton 
observed, adopting international usages and observing the law of 
war were essential considerations to determine whether non-
Western nations met the standard of civilized nations.251  In other 
words, non-Western nations had to apply the law of war if these 
states attempted to join in the international community.  In this 
regard, the standard of civilized nations was a coercive means to 
promote the universal application of the law of war through 
recruiting new members of international society, rather than 
denying the application of these rules to non-Western nations. 
Furthermore, as the records show, Western powers sought to 
apply the laws and customs of war to all nations when they codified 
these rules during the late nineteenth century.  Although fifteen of 
the states that attended the Brussels Conference were from Europe, 
the rules of warfare they recognized were intended to impose limits 
on the actions of all nations, particularly those of major powers.252  
Consequently, smaller states were interested in taking advantage of 
this circumstance to protect their rights as well in the event of war.253  
The two Hague Conferences aimed to define the laws and customs 
of war that would apply to all nations. 254   The First Hague 
Conference (1899) had twenty-six countries attending.255  It included 
all major European powers, as well as the United States and Mexico 
attending from North America, and China, Japan, Persia, Siam, and 
Turkey attending from the Near and Far East.256  The Second Hague 
Conference (1907) had forty-four countries attending.257  It included 
all the participants of the First Hague Conference and seventeen 
additional states from Central and South America. 258   The two 
Hague conferences showed that nations with different civilizations 
could meet and consent to the rules that apply to all nations.  These 
efforts clearly show that Western powers positively promoted the 
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universal application of the law of war instead of limiting its 
application among themselves.  Therefore, the standard of civilized 
nations was adopted not as a legal threshold to prevent the law of 
war from applying to non-Western nations, but rather as a criterion 
to limit law-making powers to Western nations. 
The law of war, admittedly, was not evenly applied to all nations 
during the nineteenth century.  Inconsistent state practices existed 
in obeying the law of war, as Western powers plundered countless 
cultural artifacts from non-Western nations during many colonial 
wars, which give rise to the claims for restitution today.  Indeed, the 
law of war is criticized as always applied to Western states but never 
evenly applied to non-Western states even nowadays.259  However, 
such uneven application of the law of war reflects gaps between 
what is the law and to what degree the law is followed and enforced.  
Substantial non-conformity or non-enforcement of the CIL rule 
against plunder may undermine the effectiveness of the rule, but 
may not deny the existence of the rule.  In this respect, the 
confiscations of cultural artifacts by Western powers that were 
contrary to the CIL rule against plunder, such as the looting of 
China’s Old Summer Palace, should be considered violations of the 
rule.  Restitution of these looted artifacts to their countries of origin 
thus serves as the most efficient means to strengthen the law 
conformity and enforcement. 
VI. THE PASSAGE OF TIME AND THE CIL RIGHT TO 
RESTITUTION 
There exists skepticism as to whether the CIL right to restitution 
would be extinguished due to the passage of time.260  Invoking the 
statutes of limitations on the restitution also raises this question.261  
However, statutes of limitations are indeed irrelevant because 
statues of this kind only apply within the scope of domestic law 
 
 259 See JAMES GATHII, WAR, COMMERCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW chs. 2-3 (2011). 
 260 See Merryman, supra note 18, at 1901; Ognibene, supra note 4, at 625-28. 
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rather than public international law.262  As for the passage of time, 
the evolution of the CIL against plunder and in favor of restitution 
suggest that claims for restitution of cultural artifacts will not be 
inhibited by the duration of over one and half centuries that have 
passed since the removal of these artifacts. 
This customary norm was first reflected in the practices of 
restitution that followed Napoleon’s defeat.  Napoleon plundered 
cultural artifacts for nearly twenty years.  The passage of two 
decades did not bar restitution claims and actions of victim states.  
This principle became more obvious in the peace treaties arising 
from World War I, which included clauses to return cultural artifacts 
plundered during the previous wars of the eighteenth century.  Such 
restitution clauses were not an occasional provision but became a 
feature in many of the peace treaties following World War I.  This 
principle was also shown in the peace treaties arising from World 
War II.  These treaties included clauses providing for restitution of 
looted cultural treasures not only removed during World War II but 
also those plundered during the Napoleonic Wars nearly one 
century prior.  For instance, the peace treaty with Hungary of 1947 
provided for the restitution of cultural treasures confiscated as a 
consequence of Hungarian rule over certain territories prior to 
1919.263  The Treaty of Peace with Italy also stipulated that “Italy 
shall restore to Yugoslavia all objects of artistic, historical, scientific, 
educational or religious character . . . as well as administrative 
archives” which were removed as the result of the Italian occupation 
between November 4, 1918, and March 2, 1924.264 
Furthermore, state practices have frequently reaffirmed this 
principle in recent years.  For instance, in 2007, the Chilean 
government returned almost 4000 books that had been looted by 
Chilean soldiers during its war with Peru (1879-1883) to the National 
Library of Peru.265  As Chilean Senator Alejandro Navarro declared, 
the books were required to be returned to their legitimate owners 
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because they were products of looting. 266   Likewise, in 2014, 
Argentina’s then President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner returned 
to Paraguay some furniture that had been confiscated by 
Argentinean armies during the War of the Triple Alliance (1864-
1870).267  As Argentina’s governor of Entre Ríos explained during his 
visit to Paraguay with President Kirchner, “We are going to return 
objects that were seized by the Miter government . . . as trophies of 
war,” and “we undertook the task and the duty to return them to 
the Paraguayan government . . . .”268  The two cases clearly reflect 
the opinio juris that both Chile and Argentina believe that they are 
under international obligations to return these artifacts to the 
territories where they were removed as spoils of war, and their 
admission that such an obligation will not be relieved due to the 
passage of over one century. 
In December 2018, U.S. Defense officials and the ambassador 
returned three church bells to Philippine authorities.269  American 
soldiers had carried these bells away from the Philippines as war 
trophies in 1899-1902.270  The United States also returned the San 
Pedro bell, which was similarly looted, to the Philippines in 2016.271  
According to retired U.S. Navy Capital Dennis Wright, the United 
States has returned many bells confiscated as war trophies as a 
consequence of different armed conflicts to Japan and Russia.272 
In 2011, France returned to South Korea the unique collections 
of Korean royal archives produced during the Joseon Dynasty, 
which were seized by French armies during their invasion of Korea 
in the nineteenth century. 273   France’s then President François 
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Mitterrand first agreed to return these collections in 1993. 274  
However, this decision could not be enforced because French law 
prohibits state-owned cultural artifacts from being transferred 
abroad.275  After seventeen years’ silence, former French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy confirmed on November 12, 2010 that France would 
return these collections.276  The rationale behind his agreement to 
return the collections, however, is vague.  As Sarkozy explained, “I 
know that for Koreans, these documents are very much a part of 
Korean heritage.”277  His statement sought to show sympathy and 
avoided the important question of whether this return was made 
due to an international obligation, moral duty, or merely as a 
friendly gesture for diplomatic purposes.  However, the French 
government’s method of proceeding with the return seemed to be 
based upon more than a sympathy.  To avoid the potential violation 
of the French law that prohibits such transfer, the French 
government agreed that the return of Korean Royal archives took 
the form of a five-year renewable loan, which would be 
automatically renewed every five years. 278   This agreement thus 
secured that the collections would permanently stay in Korea.  The 
National Museum of Korea and the National Library of France in 
Paris then concluded an agreement to facilitate the return on March 
16, 2011, and the 297 volumes of the royal archives were finally 
returned all at once.279 
Although President Sarkozy did not admit that France bore an 
international obligation to return these collections, such obligation 
cannot be denied under CIL that requires restitution to correct the 
international wrongdoings when state armies or agencies 
confiscated cultural artifacts as spoils of war.  This CIL obligation to 
restitution also explains why the French government was willing to 
exploit a loophole in its law to provide the permanent loan of the 
Korean royal archives, so that the restitution would not violate the 
domestic law that would otherwise prohibit such transfer. 
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More recently, French lawmakers reached a unanimous vote in 
October 2020 to return twenty-six prized artifacts preserved 
currently at the Quai Branly Museum in Paris to Benin.280  These 
artifacts once were plundered during the 1892 pillaging of the palace 
of Abomey in Dahomey, and Benin is expected to receive these 
artifacts within a year since this vote.281 
The customary norm regarding duration in terms of restitution 
of cultural artifacts removed during international warfare strongly 
suggests that the passage of over one and a half centuries does not 
bar the right to restitution. This customary norm is significant today, 
because in many cases, the looting occurred well over a century 
ago.282  Establishing this customary norm thus provides a firm legal 
ground for states claiming restitution today. 
VII. LIMITATIONS TO THE RIGHT TO RESTITUTION 
As previously analyzed, countries of origin have the right to the 
restitution of cultural artifacts removed as spoils of war in 
nineteenth-century warfare.  However, does this right mean that 
every piece of plundered artifacts must be returned?  This Part 
considers the limitations to enforce restitution, which require that 
the objects for restitution still exist and are identifiable, with a 
practical consideration of necessity that should be determined by 
claiming states. 
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a. The Requirement that the Objects Still Exist and Are Identifiable 
The requirement that the objects still exist is the prerequisite to 
enforcing restitution.  According to Article 35(a) of Articles on State 
Responsibility, a situation in which the objects for restitution are 
“materially impossible” to return can preclude the obligation to 
restitution.283  The rationale is clear.  One cannot return property that 
physically no longer exists.  This situation arose when France was 
asked to return plundered artifacts after Napoleon’s defeat; 
however, many cultural properties were already ruined by the time 
that the allied powers claimed their right of restitution.284 
The principle of identification marks another limitation to 
restitution, requiring that cultural artifacts for restitution have to be 
identified as those that were in fact plundered from the territory of 
removal; otherwise, it is impossible to restore the former 
possession. 285   In the case of Napoleon’s restitution, it was 
impractical for victim states to recover all their lost cultural artifacts 
because many of these artifacts could not be found.  First, there was 
no written record stating what had been plundered from other 
European nations or what had been stored in French museums.286  
Therefore, states took mostly what was easily demonstrably 
theirs. 287   Furthermore, many of Napoleon’s plundered artifacts 
were first stored in Paris museums, but then were secretly 
transferred to provincial churches and museums to avoid being 
discovered during the peace negotiations. 288   Without any 
comprehensive records, such concealment made it very difficult for 
claiming states to track down lost treasures. 
b. Necessity of Restitution 
It is sometimes not necessary for countries of origin to recover 
all pieces of plundered artifacts for practical considerations, such as 
 
 283 Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, supra note 42, art. 35(a), 
 284 See Sandholtz, supra note 156, at 152. 
 285 See KOWALSKI, supra note 3, at 46-47, 50. 
 286 TREUE, supra note 3, at 193. 
 287 Id. 
 288 See Sandholtz, supra note 156, at 152. 
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the cost of transportation or convenience.289  The goal is usually to 
regain lost cultural property that is truly significant to the cultural 
heritage of a nation.  For instance, in the looting of China’s Old 
Summer Palace case, it has been estimated that over one and a half 
million artifacts were plundered by the joint British and French 
armies in 1860.290   Would the Chinese government expect a full 
restitution, even if these pieces were all discovered one day?  The 
pieces most important to recover would be the unique and 
irreplaceable artifacts, such as the series of copper zodiac animal 
heads removed from a main fountain, which constituted a special 
feature of the Old Summer Palace architecture. 291   Likewise, 
countless cultural properties were looted by British armies from 
India during the nineteenth century, and it would be difficult, if not 
impossible, to recover them all.  Among these spoils of war, the 
Kohinoor diamond is of special importance to India not merely as a 
piece of jewelry, but also because of its associations with Indian 
kings over hundreds of years.292  The unique symbolic meaning that 
the Kohinoor diamond represents in the history of ancient Indian 
civilization makes this diamond irreplaceable to Indian cultural 
heritage. 
Restitution in this context thus does not merely mean a complete 
restoration of the situation to the status quo ante in order to seek 
justice, but it combines with a consideration of necessity.  In this 
sense, it is reasonable to conclude that countries of origin have the 
right to receive full restitution limited by necessity as a practical 
consideration.  Moreover, which items are ultimately included in the 
inventories of restitution should be determined by countries of 
origin, since they have the best judgment of the value of various 
artifacts to their cultural legacy. 
 
 289 See TREUE, supra note 3, at 198 (noting that Austrians exchanged a large 
painting for a smaller one, since the latter was easier to dispatch, and the Florentines 
abandoned twenty-nine paintings to the Louvre due to the probable cost of 
transport). 
 290 China’s State Bureau of Cultural Property Condemned the British Auction House 
to Sell the China’s Old Summer Palace Plunders, supra note 11. 
 291  The series of copper zodiac animal heads removed from China’s Old 
Summer Palace were frequently auctioned by Sotheby’s and Christie’s in recent 
decades.  See Bowlby, supra note 13. 
 292 See Saby Ghoshray, Repatriation of the Kohinoor Diamond: Expanding the Legal 
Paradigm for Cultural Heritage, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 741, 746–48 (2008). 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
Throughout the nineteenth century until the present, the CIL law 
of war has prohibited the looting of cultural property and required 
restitution as the primary form of reparations for such violations.  
The CIL rule against plunder was established in the laws and 
customs of war under natural law jurisprudence at the end of the 
eighteenth century.  This rule remained valid throughout the 
nineteenth century, even though the philosophy of international law 
changed from natural law toward positivism.  It was further 
developed during the twentieth century and finally led to the 1954 
Hague Convention as well as its protocols. 
The CIL right to restitution is based on the first-tier international 
obligation that prohibits the plunder of cultural property during 
wartime.  During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
restitution was deemed to be the legal remedy when the capture of 
property was made contrary to the law of war.  Acts of restitution 
that occurred after Napoleon’s time and the two World Wars 
consistently reflect that restitution serves as the primary remedy for 
violations of the law of war against plunder. 
The evolution of the CIL rules that prohibit the looting of 
cultural property and require restitution shows that these rules were 
not merely European customs, but rather general CILs that should 
apply to all nations.  The so-called standard of civilized nations was 
merely a means to limit law-making powers to Western nations, 
rather than to deny the application of the law of war to other non-
European nations during the nineteenth century.  Moreover, even 
the passage of over one and a half centuries since the removal of 
cultural artifacts does not inhibit claims for restitution.  The CIL 
right to restitution require that plundered artifacts still exist and are 
identifiable, otherwise this right could not be enforced.  Claiming 
states have the right to determine the necessity of restitution as a 
practical consideration. 
These arguments strongly rebut the presumptions that there 
were no rules in the law of war during the nineteenth century that 
regulated military practices in respect of cultural artifacts, and there 
is no basis in international law today for claiming restitution.  This 
article thus provides an original interpretation of CIL-making in the 
law of war that prohibits looting cultural property, paving the legal 
grounds for claiming historically looted cultural property today.  
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Applying these conclusions to current disputes would ultimately 
transform the current debates about restitution and retention.  
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